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ABSTRACT 
 In the past, research into the field of human rights has treated regime as a 
dichotomous variable and divided the type of governmental structure into either 
autocracies or democracies. By lumping all democracies into one category, all 
variation between different categories of governmental composition is discarded 
and it is difficult to examine the differences between types of democratic 
governments and their human rights capacities. Due to their tendency to accrete 
power centrally, presidential democracies are thought to repress the rights of 
citizens more often and severely than parliamentary systems. Further, an 
exogenous shock to the political system, such as the threat or the imposition of an 
economic sanction is expected to act as a catalyst for repression. Using three 
different datasets of indicators of physical integrity human rights from a global 
sample over the years of 1976-1990 for two datasets and 1981-1990 for another, 
democracies are indeed shown to differ in their propensity to violate human 
rights.  The effect of economic sanctions is negligible and is only significant in 
one model.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Research into the topic of human rights has typically focused on the 
differences between autocratic regimes and democratic states.  In that tradition, 
the common wisdom holds that it is autocracies are more apt to foster human 
rights violations than democracies.   While democracy’s superior human rights 
record in comparison to autocracies has been historically exhibited in prolific 
amounts of research, dichotomizing the governmental system of a state tosses 
away a tremendous amount of variation. Democracy, no matter the compositional 
structure or characteristics, are homogenized into a single category.  Because 
democracies are codified into a single category, it is impossible to parse out the 
distinctive outcomes associated with parliamentary or presidential democracies. 
As American influence expanded outward after the conclusion of the Second 
World War, establishing similar democratically governed states in the developing 
world rose to a prominent foreign policy goal.1 In working to foster democracy, 
little attention was paid to the compositional design of democratic governments.  
What mattered most is that they were democratic.  This thesis shows that there is 
a fundamental difference between democratic systems, which have implications 
for the human well-being of citizens within these states.  Not all democracies are 
                                                          
1. John. Martinussen, State, Society, and Market: A Guide to Competing 
Theories of Development (New York: Zed Books, 1997), 34-35. 
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created equal. Due to the diffuse nature of policy-making power, parliamentary 
democracies are less likely to repress their populations.  Following that argument, 
presidential democracies, because power is centralized in one figure, and often 
because of their military heritage are more prone to engage in human rights 
abuses.  Initial decisions in how a democratic state should be organized and how 
power is to be distributed carry significant weight. This work seeks to address that 
gap in the literature and further explore the differences that exist between 
presidential and parliamentary governments in one of the most fundamental 
aspects of their “democraticness,” their respect for the human rights of their 
citizenry.   
On a Mission to Forge Democracy Around the Globe 
After the terroristic attacks perpetrated on September 11, 2001 against the 
United States, American forces quickly suppressed and contained the influence of 
Al Qaeda in Afghanistan.  Almost immediately, the eyes of American leadership 
turned to Iraq. Within months, military forces from the United States were 
deployed into the nation and the political regime of Saddam Hussein quickly fell.  
In political discussions, the precise and full motivation for the invasion of Iraq in 
2003 has been vehemently debated.  On the eve of commencement of American 
operations in Iraq, President George W. Bush delivered a radio address to the 
nation where he explained a multi-faceted reasoning for its engagement in the 
region.  On March 22, 2003 President George W. Bush stated, “Our cause is just, 
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the security of the nations we serve and the peace of the world. And our mission 
is clear, to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, to end Saddam Hussein's 
support for terrorism, and to free the Iraqi people.”2  The motivation that the goal, 
arguably the final goal, of the operation is to free the Iraqi people is illuminating.  
Freedom, namely the freedom of self-governance via democracy was a goal of the 
American involvement in Iraq.  In the Iraqi campaign, two distinct inputs of 
American foreign policy were intertwined: human rights and democratic 
proliferation.  More striking, rather than being seen as completely separate ideas, 
democracy and variations of human rights are often seen as complimentary, albeit 
potentially endogenous, concepts.  In that regard, democracies are perceived as 
bastions of human rights recognition and respect and the foreign policies of many 
of the world’s political power is to see that democracies are proliferated around 
the globe with autocracies transitioning into democratic states.   
President Bush, in the same radio address, articulated the message to both 
Americans and Iraqis that:  
In this conflict, American and coalition forces face enemies who have no  
regard for the conventions of war or rules of morality. Iraqi officials have 
placed troops and equipment in civilian areas, attempting to use innocent 
men, women and children as shields for the dictator's army. I want 
Americans and all the world to know that coalition forces will make every 
effort to spare innocent civilians from harm.3   
                                                          
2. George W. Bush, “President Discusses Beginning of Operation Iraqi 
Freedom,” The White House, accessed December 23, 2017, https://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030322.html.  
3. Ibid.  
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The message is clear.  America, a democracy, will attempt to respect the physical 
integrity rights of the Iraqi people, even while the authoritarian regime of Saddam 
Hussein blatantly disregards the human rights of his citizenry. By connecting the 
two statements, a promise that a democratic future for Iraq will also be a future 
composed of more protection for human rights of the people of Iraq was laid out 
as an American foreign policy goal.  By toppling and removing a sadistic 
authoritarian leader and allowing the people of Iraq to govern themselves, 
Americans believed that democracy would take root and flourish.  Ideally, the 
trend would continue through the rest of the Middle East, bringing in a period of 
grassroots democratization to the region which has traditionally been dominated 
by militaristic or religiously based authoritarian systems.   
America has long pursued a mission of democratization around the globe. 
Although other political factors accounted for the motivation for American 
intervention into international affairs, democratization and preserving democracy 
has, at a minimum, often been cited as an influence toward heightened 
involvement abroad.  When the United States, and the world community 
aggregately, have worked to build a democracy from the ashes of a fallen 
authoritarian nation the end goal is only democracy rather than considering the 
full scope of how the institutions will coalesce.  Democracy is too often viewed as 
monolithic by policy makers and scholars alike.  Although the differences 
between democratic structures are understood, the end result of democratic 
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features (i.e. equality before the law, right to representation and preservation of 
human and private property rights to list a few) are perceived as relatively 
equivalent between all types of democracy. For example, in the wake of the 
Second World War, the dominant goal of the United States was to contain Soviet 
influence and the spread of communism.  One of the main ways that this was 
accomplished was by attempting to foster democracy, where possible.  In the 
Republic of South Korea, for instance, any democratic regime, even if it was not 
ideal by democratic and human rights standard in the purest sense was viewed as 
an advantageous region for American influence.4   
By considering regimes through a dichotomous lens of authoritarian or 
democratic there is considerable variation that is being ignored.  Considering the 
theoretical and political implications of democracy building at the present and in 
the future, it is a spurious assumption to maintain that all democratic variants are 
ultimately the same with only superficial differences in their institutions and the 
structure of their compositions.  If there are ultimately differences in the political 
governance between different variations of democracies then the questions of how 
those variations manifest themselves and what are the potential catalysts that lead 
to differences should be theoretically and empirically assessed. 
                                                          
4. Lee Hyun-hee, Park Sung-soo and Yoon Nae-hyun, New History of 
Korea (Gyeonggi-do, Korea: Jimoondang, 2005), 584-586.   
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This thesis will commence with an overview of three branches of research 
beginning with inspection of human rights. Conceptually, human rights are a 
broad topic and encapsulates a wide array of different attributions.  Having 
evolved over time, the definition of what is specifically a human right is often 
debated.  Physical protections against state violence or force are solidly 
entrenched in the literature. Second, this work will move to the topic of economic 
sanctions.  Considering coercion of foreign actors, economic sanctions represent a 
moderate choice between talk, which is cheap, and military engagement, which is 
costly and risky. With respect to diplomacy and disputes amongst democratic 
states, sanctioning represents a more severe signal of the resolve of the sender and 
simultaneously sends a domestic signal to the population of the recipient nation 
about the policies of the leadership.  Finally, this analysis will address the 
dynamics and features of democracies. Although they are often homogenized into 
a singular concept, the nuance of democracy type is fundamentally important.  
Organizationally, this order seems appropriate.  Through explaining what is meant 
by human rights, it is easier to explain certain features of democratic states and 
their requisites.  Further, as stated at the onset of this chapter, democracies are 
both peaceful with one another and more apt to fight wars that they are certain 
they will win.5  Economic sanctions are often a tool of coercion for democracies, 
against autocracies and other democracies.  In this regard, the framework of this 
                                                          
5. Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam, Democracies at War (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2002), 9. 
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thesis builds conceptually, from human rights toward democracies.  Each concept 
helps in understanding others.   
 In addressing the topical question of how and why economic sanctions 
impact human rights negatively in presidential systems over their parliamentary 
counterparts, this thesis utilizes a statistical analysis with an overall timeframe of 
27 years ranging from 1981 through 2008.  This period offers a range of 
international cut points including the Cold War, the intermediate period following 
the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent post September 11th War on 
Terrorism. Each of these time periods are unique, thereby limiting the influence of 
unique historical conditions upon the results that are obtained (e.g. the bipolarity 
of the Cold War period).   After exhibiting the differences between democratic 
variations, this thesis will conclude with the implications from the findings and 
the consequences that not all democracies are created equal.  Distinction in 
democratic institutions contain significant gravity and bear consequences for 
American and international foreign policy.  Ultimately, it is not enough to work to 
just build democracy.  Just as there has been a push in policy to implement so 
called “smart sanctions” there must also be an adjustment to work for “smart 
democracies” that represent the citizenry and protect their fundamental human 
rights in their own domestic policy.   
Considering the words of President George W. Bush at the onset of the 
invasion of Iraq in 2003, protection of human rights in Iraq was an American 
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goal.  The Americans promised to do all in their power to mitigate the danger to 
Iraqi citizens and, likewise, it was proposed that once democracy had been 
installed that human rights protections would also be formalized.  Democracy, is 
conceptually tied to the protection of human rights. There is no scholarly debate 
that democracies are more conducive to human rights protections that their 
autocratic counterparts.  Consideration of that subject would be retreading well-
travelled theoretical and empirical ground.  Further, there is the seemingly 
apodictic principle within the international relations sub-field encapsulated within 
the democratic peace theory that democracies do not engage in war with one 
another. Further, democracies are typically picky about the military engagements 
in which they involve themselves.  Democracies are apt to only fight those wars 
in which they are likely to win.6   Although peaceful with one another militarily, 
democracies do disagree, often intensely.  Because democracies are not likely 
fight militarily, disagreements often take other forms, namely economic. As such, 
economic sanctions operate as an exogenous shock to the democratic system and 
are often some of the most severe threats that the nation will experience.  
Likewise, events of economic sanctioning and coercion are far more numerous 
than threats of military force and provide a larger numerical set for analysis and 
interpretation.  
                                                          
6. Reiter and Stam, 9. 
9 
 
This work seeks to address the differences between democracies and 
simultaneously add to the understanding on the efficacy of sanctions and of 
human rights recognition. It is a daunting task to attempt to intersect three distinct 
concepts from different subfields of political research.  By synthesizing each of 
these concepts a richer and more robust understanding of each and the world as a 
whole can be achieved.   
This thesis, analyzes the outcome and later generational consequences of 
both international and foreign policy.7 Domestic choices, such as how leaders 
determine to establish their government, have international consequences.  
Likewise, foreign policy choices, such as the United States advocating for 
democracy or intervening to topple an autocrat, have domestic ramifications for 
the target nation.  Therefore, the choice of a state to implement an economic 
sanction, a moderate form of international economic coercion, has the potential to 
create human externalities if the domestic conditions are appropriate.   
It is important to remember that each of these concepts does not exist and 
operate in a vacuum.  Politically, the choices and outcomes of decisions spread 
outward, influencing and affecting other concepts and fields. Robert Putnam, in 
analyzing diplomatic negotiations between states, articulated that negotiations 
operate within two different, yet connected fields.  Actors deal with other actors 
                                                          
7. Thomas Sowell, Applied Economics: Thinking Beyond Stage One (New 
York: Basic 2009), 2-4.  
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on both the international sphere and the domestic sphere. What happens on one 
level impacts the other level.8  Putnam’s principle of two-level analysis is 
appropriate when discussing economic sanctions, human rights, and democratic 
regime construction.  Each of these variables influences and affects the other, both 
on the international and the domestic level.   Within politics, there are 
fundamental connections of concepts that have been unexplored.  This research 
provides insight into each of these subjects and elucidates the connections 
between them.  By attempting to tie three distinct concepts together, the fabric of 
the reality of the political spectrum can be more deeply elucidated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8. Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two- 
Level Games,” International Organization, 42 (1988). 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE HUMAN CONDITION: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 
Introduction 
Human rights as a field of research has gained significant traction in recent 
decades.  Scholarly debate has characterized practically every aspect of 
investigations into human rights.  Basic foundations of research such as 
conceptualization and measurement have been hotly debated by many scholars. 
Debate is warranted, as conceptualization and measurement of human rights are 
essential for scientific study.  Beyond issues of measurement and conception, a 
plethora of theoretical explanations of the specific conditions that influence 
different aspects of human rights occupy a position within the literature.  The 
amount of debate and discourse that characterizes human rights is evidence to the 
fact that this sphere of political science is still developing and is still formulating 
conceptually, theoretically, and empirically.   
This chapter will commence with a brief historical assessment of the 
development of human rights in theory and in practice.  Second, an assessment 
will be conducted on the issue of conceptualization, and subsequently, the 
measurement of human rights.  Third, it is essential to examine the impact of 
globalization upon human rights abuses and recognition.  As the world becomes 
increasingly globalized, it simultaneously becomes a smaller place.  As such, it is 
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more difficult to hide abuses of any severity from the world community.  Today, 
one person with a cell phone can alert the entire world to repression occurring 
within a country. Fourth, moving forward from conceptualization, the impact of 
human rights on American foreign policy can be analyzed.  This is fundamentally 
important for the purpose of this thesis, because economic sanctions represent a 
relatively inexpensive but also a strong signal to recipients and other actors in the 
system. Finally, it is necessary to consider the ramifications of human rights 
policy on sovereignty rights.  Protecting human rights is a major component of 
American policy and international law.  In attempting to enforce human rights, the 
overlap between physical integrity rights and state sovereignty is blurred.   
Human Rights Throughout Human History 
The focus of this section is to analyze the historical development of the 
conceptualization of human rights and, therefore, attempt to gain a more nuanced 
understanding of what is entailed within the trajectory of human rights.  With the 
passage of time, human rights have evolved significantly in both scope and in the 
implications of policy that are associated with them. By considering the historical 
and philosophical evolution of human rights as a field and as a concept, which can 
be quantified and studied, it will be possible to assess the impact of economic 
sanctions on the quantifiable level of human rights within a democratic system.  
First, human rights in antiquity will be addressed. Second, the trajectory will be 
traced to the Reformation and Enlightenment period in Europe where it 
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influenced the young United States and its founders. Third, and finally, the 
modern interpretation of human rights in the post-World War II period will be 
briefly assessed.   
Although many scholars posit that human rights is a fairly modern 
development in the realm of political science and policy studies, the roots of this 
field date back to antiquity.  In ancient Mesopotamia, Hammurabi codified the 
laws of his Babylonian kingdom nearly 3,000 years ago to form the Code of 
Hammurabi. This code, while simultaneously depicting the king as a deity, 
established basic protections for citizens including penalties for committing 
violence against others.  Further, it also established what might be understood 
today as a minimum wage for work.9 Therefore, the Code of Hammurabi 
influenced multiple aspects of the human existence and condition, and its impact 
as a legal code has extended down through history to the current day.  Despite the 
protections in certain areas of physical integrity and for economic rights, there 
were still distinctions made between wealthy elites and poor laborers and also 
between men and women in their rights and protections. In that respect, while 
there were human rights incorporated into the code, they were hardly universal, 
but rather subjective in the populations and groups which they served based upon 
the circumstances.10   Although this code was flawed in many ways, it did provide 
                                                          
9. Jean Bottéro, The 'Code' of Hammurabi" in Mesopotamia: Writing, 
Reasoning and the Gods (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 165. 
10. Ibid., 167.  
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a governmental source for protection of multiple variations of human rights as 
they are understood today.  
Moving forward in history to the Reformation period of Europe, the idea 
of the responsibility of man to one another and, more important, the duties of the 
state to its citizens became a fundamental source of investigation.  There are many 
theorists that could be credited as a source of framing the idea of natural rights 
and many, lengthier, volumes have been written to explore this history.  Much of 
the credit for this philosophical thinking can be credited to the Dutch jurist, Hugo 
Grotius.  According to George Sabine in his interpretation of Grotius’ view of 
natural law, “certain broad principles of justice are natural—that is natural and 
unchangeable—and upon these principles are erected the varying systems of 
municipal law, all depending upon the sanctity of covenants, and also 
international law, which depends upon the sanctity of covenants between 
rulers.”11  Ergo, by virtue of the simple fact that one is human, there are certain 
conditions of integrity that are deserved, and likewise, there are simultaneously 
specific expectations of action that govern the manner in which individuals act 
toward one another.  Similarly, these covenants, as Sabine attributed the concept, 
exist between rulers and the governed.  Because rulers represent the state, and in 
many cases, they are the embodiment of the state and its capacity, they are subject 
                                                          
11. George H. Sabine, A History of Political Theory, (New York: Henry 
Holt and Company, 1953), 424. 
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to the same moral and natural laws that govern the interactions between 
individuals as it pertains to basic human freedoms.  Figures such as Hugo Grotius 
served as a philosophical foundation on which to build and expand the conceptual 
definitions of human rights.  Political philosophers during the enlightenment and 
beyond grappled with the issue of state respect for individual rights and precisely 
how these protections should be made manifest in the public realm via political 
policy. The legacy of Hugo Grotius was passed down to influential thinkers such 
as John Locke, who, in turn, had a massive impact upon the American framers of 
the Constitution. Innate rights which are possessed by all individuals was a 
foundational base for Locke and is reflected as well in the American founders’ 
writing, although there were still areas in which human integrity suffered.12  As 
such, he acted as a philosophical bridge between the classic thought of antiquity 
and the modern interpretations of human rights, which still are developing today.  
Historically, most view the history of human rights as originating in 1948 
with the drafting and ratification of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights 
(UHDR).  The declaration’s adoption by the fledgling United Nations 
organization was a seminal event and established a precedent moving forward for 
                                                          
12. Jeremy Waldron, God, Locke, and Equality: Christian Foundations in 
Locke’s Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 189.   
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the tenets of basic human dignity.13 14  Human rights was an especially potent 
issue at this juncture and its salience was understandable considering the prior 
half-century where atrocities had been committed against enemy combatants and 
innocents by both the Nazis and the Imperial Japanese.  While the UHDR outlined 
a wide range of human rights issues and significantly moved the conversation 
forward to a globally recognized scale, it was hardly the first attempt to codify 
human rights.15  Throughout human history, gradual steps have been taken that 
have expanded and solidified the rights of individuals inherent simply by the 
conditionality of being a person.  Human rights have been prevalent throughout 
history.  First in antiquity, through the Reformation in Europe and to the modern 
day with the UHDR.   
Back to the Basics: Conceptual and Measurement Issues in the Human 
Rights Literature 
 After considering how human rights developed throughout history, it is 
essential to explore what is meant conceptually when human rights are discussed.  
In fact, there is significant conceptually flexibility within the idea and human 
rights are evolving today to meet new needs and situational demands.  Over time, 
                                                          
13. Aryeh Neier, The International Human Rights Movement: A History 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012).  
14. Kathryn Sikkink, Evidence for Hope: Making Human Rights Work in 
the 21st Century (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2017).  
15 . Paul Gordon Lauren, The Evolution of International Human Rights: 
Visions Seen (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003).  
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human rights have evolved to encompass more aspects of the human condition. 
First, its necessary to assess the notion of human rights as a viable and moral 
source of inquiry is essential.  Then, second, the discussion can move forward to 
the conceptual definition of what human rights entails.  One might consider the 
theoretical conception of human rights as a series of concentric circles, beginning 
with a core and moving outward away from the center while simultaneously 
becoming broader and encompassing more space.  At the most basic level, human 
rights are encapsulated within physical integrity rights. Physical integrity rights 
represent the individual and their personal body.  They have the right to be free 
from physical harm and to control the direction of their own body and will.  
Moving outward, civil and political rights are related to physical integrity rights 
because physical repression can often be politically motivated as a consequence 
for dissent.  Yet, political and civil human rights represent the ability of the 
individual to express themselves publicly, and simultaneously be treated as equal 
in civil society regardless of their physical, religious or other intangible attributes.  
Finally, social and economic rights are the broadest and most subject to debate 
and interpretation.  Factors such as wages, lifestyle, education, and opportunity 
are categorized under the umbrella of social and economic rights.  As such, there 
is still considerable fuzziness over precisely what these rights entail and how they 
can be enforced.   
18 
 
Some of the earliest work in the study of human rights by political 
scientists had little to do with assessing how or if the rights of human beings were 
being recognized or what were the correlated phenomenon that possibly 
influenced certain levels of these rights.  Instead, studies largely focused on the 
concept of human rights and its moral legitimacy as a field of inquiry within 
social sciences.  Early research questions centered on whether it was ethically 
justifiable to attempt to study something as reprehensible as violations of human 
freedoms in a scientific manner.16  Some scholars believed that it was wrong to 
potentially sterilize human rights abuses by attempt to quantify violations for 
study.  Regardless of the moral question the study and measurement of human 
rights has been integral in understanding the scope and breadth of respect for 
fundamental human rights.  According to Landman, establishing a rigorous and 
systematic study of human rights serves a multitude of purposes. Inquiry allows 
further classification of violations which allows more systematic monitoring and 
recording of violations.17  Further, better record-keeping of violations allows 
trends and patterns to be recognized through cross-sectional analysis. By looking 
at violations over the course of an extended period of time and a sufficient sample 
of units, predictions can be made.  These predictions, according to Landman, offer 
substantial policy benefits in that violations can be theoretically explained, and 
                                                          
16. David Louis Cingranelli, Human Rights: Theory and Measurement 
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1988). 
17. Todd Landman, “Measuring Human Rights: Principle, Practice and 
Policy,” Human Rights Quarterly 26 (November 2004). 
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reduced in future cases.18  Thus, the saliency and political importance of human 
rights as an area of formal analysis is obvious.  By understanding the concept 
more fully, lives of individuals around the world can be greatly enriched.  
 The term human rights can be ambiguously broad. When researchers 
indicate that they are analyzing human rights the precise focus of their question 
can be difficult to immediately ascertain.  Therefore, when discussing human 
rights, it is not uncommon for two researchers to mean two different things.  
Conceptually human rights are especially broad and includes a range of finer, 
more specific sub-concepts.  At the most fundamental level, human rights can be 
been divided into four different components. Human rights can be viewed as 
either being political, social, economic, or civil in nature.19 20 21  The traditional 
definition and understanding of human rights, which is constructed through 
political and civil human rights, is akin to what a majority of the population 
understand human rights to entail. Civil and political human rights make up the 
core of human rights resolutions and laws.  Civil and political human rights are 
fundamental in that they serve as the basis to all levels of human physical 
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integrity rights. More importantly, these are basic freedoms which one is entitled 
to simply because they are human.22 If individuals do not have equality on all 
levels of these basic and fundamental human freedoms it is difficult to consider 
them full members of the society in which they live and operate.23  Furthermore, it 
seems that it is impossible for there to be any development into higher levels of 
social and economic human rights which have been outlined by some researchers 
without a firm foundation of recognition in these basic political and civil human 
rights.24 In other words, while the definition of what is specifically a human right 
continues to evolve and accrete new statuses as time progresses and individuals 
become more enlightened and informed of the world around them, it appears 
unlikely that recognition of those new definitions will be recognized or honored 
unless these basic fundamental freedoms are granted to all members of the society 
interested in bolstering its levels of human rights recognition. Political and Civil 
human rights are considered first generation rights because they were the first to 
be established and widely accepted as norms accepted.25 26  Recognition of these 
first-generation rights is prerequisite for acceptance and enforcement of later 
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generation rights.  Without basic respect for political and civil security, it is 
impossible to move further toward recognizing other aspects of human rights.  It 
is evident, therefore, that these basic freedoms which are contained within the 
conception of civil and political human rights are essential for the well-being and 
dignity of all human beings.   
The two other aspects of human rights are not as widely recognized as 
integral components of human rights respect; however, economic and social rights 
are gaining traction with academic and activist audiences. Economic and social 
rights entail aspects of society such as the right to social security, the right to 
economic growth and wealth, the right to continuous improvement of living 
conditions, and the right to development.27  28  These formulations of human 
rights initially seem to be difficult to defend as fundamental human rights that all 
are entitled to receive, yet, as globalization becomes a more powerful force within 
our world, many researchers and authors are arguing for them as an engrained 
aspect of the conversation and discourse when discussing the definition of human 
rights. Every person’s right to economic and social welfare is fiercely advocated 
by Felice in what he calls the “global new deal” which is seen as a global mimicry 
of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal Program.29  Further, these economic and 
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social rights are being increasingly recognized by international agencies and 
organizations concerned with the improvement and recognition of human rights 
around the globe.  According to Abouharb and Cingranelli: 
The UDHR, for example recognizes the right to social security (Article  
22), to work, to just and favorable conditions of work, to protection  
against unemployment, to equal pay for equal work, to an existence  
worthy of human dignity (Article 23), to rest and leisure, to reasonable  
limitations on working hours, to periodic holidays with pay (Article 24), to  
a standard of living adequate to maintain health and well-being, to food,  
clothing, housing and medical care, to necessary social services, to  
security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood,  
old age, or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control  
(Article 25), to free elementary education, and to higher education on the  
basis of merit (Article 26)30 
Clearly, some of these social and economic rights which are increasingly being 
recognized by authorities and agencies with the progression of time are rather 
vague, and, therefore, difficult to defend and advocate.  For example, “an 
existence worthy of human dignity” is not specific and leaves a great deal of room 
for interpretation.  It might be argued in one case that the individual was not given 
the opportunity for an existence worthy of human dignity, while in a precisely 
similar scenario; it was deemed that the individual was granted an existence 
which met the standards of human dignity.  When compared with the other facets 
of social and economic human rights which have been outlined, it does seem that 
we can garner a semblance of an understanding of what precisely constitutes “an 
existence worthy of human dignity.”  It should also be noted that many of these 
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basic economic and social human rights which these researchers described are not 
even recognized or honored in nations which are typically perceived as adherents 
and honorees of human rights.  Many of these economic and social rights have not 
been as readily accepted or recognized within states or even internationally as the 
civil and political aspects of human rights have been.   
 One of the most interesting aspects of human rights which has been 
advocated in recent years, and is related theoretically to economic rights, is the 
“right to development.”  Even the authors, Abouharb and Cingranelli assert that 
the right to development is difficult to define and, therefore, subject to some 
degree of debate.31  Despite the apparent ambiguity which is inherent within the 
subject, Cingranelli and Abouharb asserted that, “the emphasis is upon the 
simultaneous achievement of economic growth and the realization of economic 
and social rights.”32  Thus, the definition of the right to development contains: 
the right to food, the right to health, the right to education the right to  
housing, and other economic, social, and cultural rights, as well as all the  
civil and political rights together with the rates of growth of GDP and  
other financial, technical and institutional resources that enable any  
improvement in the well-being of the entire population and the realization  
of the rights to be sustained.33 
It is abundantly clear, therefore, that the definition of human rights is constantly 
evolving with the passage of time and with the enlightenment of humanity as a 
whole.  As people become more aware of the problems and the crises which 
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negatively or adversely affect individuals they seek to understand how to 
ameliorate the harmful cause which had established a dilemma. As a result, things 
which are determined to be beneficial to human well-being are categorized as a 
human right which is to be possessed by all individuals, and likewise those things 
which are not seen as conducive to human integrity are deemed to be an affront to 
the integral rights which all people possess.  In this sense then, it is clear that the 
definition of human rights has evolved in recent years.  It was once maintained 
that the traditional view of human rights which contained rights such as the right 
to vote, the freedom of religion, freedom from discrimination, and other similar 
rights fell within the realm and domain of human rights; however, with the 
progression of understanding and the integration of societies and beliefs, the 
definition of fundamental human rights and freedoms has evolved and acquired 
further explanations. Development itself is seen as a potential field for the 
expansion of human rights.34  Economic successes and economic parity have been 
conceptually framed as a new terrain for human rights protections at the domestic 
and international level through an expansion of policy.35 It seems that as time 
progresses further that the understanding of what precisely is meant by human 
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rights will continue to expand and develop. Whereas physical integrity rights were 
not globally recognized for years, social and economic aspects of human rights 
are continuing to gain traction with both scholars and policy makers.   It is clear, 
however, that there are a number of definitions which have already been 
established which researchers are able to utilize and, therefore, study the effects of 
certain social factors upon human rights.  
 Indeed, in the United States, the Affordable Care Act established a 
precedent where medical care is now perceived as a human right of all citizens 
and non-citizens in the nation.   Just via the condition of being human one is 
entitled to medical care that is provided and paid by the state.  Fundamentally, the 
right to medical care occupies a space within the realm of a social or economic 
right. Due to the expansion of the scope of human rights in the theoretical debate, 
issues such as health care, college education, minimum income and even access to 
information through access to the internet are discussed as measurable indicators 
of human rights within a locale.36  Development rights that are encapsulated 
within the connotation of social and economic rights diverge largely from the 
more basic and fundamental recognitions of human rights that are generally 
accepted and recognized by many governments and international bodies.  Newer, 
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and broader definitional conceptualizations of human rights are gaining 
substantial traction in the academic literature.  The transition from postulation to 
policy might take some amount of time and reorientation of culture.  Further, even 
were these types of rights to be broadly, or even universally, accepted there is no 
certainty that nations would have the capacity or capability to implement these 
variants of human rights in level that would meet the international standard.  If on 
the other hand, the universally accepted level of accommodation was so low that 
every nation could meet their social and economic rights obligations then it begs 
the question of why implement a standard at all if the standard is essentially no 
standard.   
 Human rights, conceptually and theoretically has evolved tremendously in 
the time since the earliest conceptions began to formulate within the codified laws 
of ancient civilizations.  In the past few hundred years, the relationship between 
citizens and the state have aided in the realization of people that there is a 
responsibility on the part of the state to seek to protect people from harm and to 
mitigate the threat to their person through various forms of violence. This 
responsibility is especially strong when considering violence that forms as a 
function of the capacity of the state and its leadership.  Considering John Locke, 
upon leaving the State of Nature, the social contract between the state and the 
individual demands that the state fulfills its obligations to the protection of the life 
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and person of the individuals who are within it.37  Argumentation from this line of 
philosophy helped to form the discourse of the American founders.  Likewise, the 
atrocities and the human suffering perpetrated by the Soviets, Nazis in Germany, 
and other regimes demanded action through the UDHR.  In the contemporary day 
and age, the debate rests largely on inequality.  People are often most active and 
vocal about the potential issues that they view and witness.  As such, social and 
economic rights are becoming a source of increased debate between scholars, 
policy-makers, and individual citizens alike.  With the passage of time and the 
acceptance of certain aspects of life as a human right, it is likely that the 
conceptual definition of human rights will continue to expand.  Although now, the 
periphery of human rights conceptualization rests at issues such as the right to 
healthcare, the right to education, and the right to a certain economic wage.  In the 
future, human rights can potentially expand outward to unforeseen areas such as 
the right to opportunity, wherein every individual is entitled to the right to have 
equal opportunity regardless of skill or aptitude.  In this respect then, human 
rights expansion might could arguably become counterproductive to societal 
outcomes rather than beneficial to the well-being of a healthy and functioning 
society.  It does seem likely that the expansion of the concept will continue with 
the passage of time though.   
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Human rights as a monolithic concept can be nebulous and subject to 
ambiguity.  Considering human rights as a series of concentric circles where each 
layer builds upon the previous is a useful tool for dissecting the intricacies of the 
concept of human rights. At the core of the circle is the most basic and 
fundamental variation of human rights, physical integrity rights.  Moving 
outward, civil and political rights appear.  In many nations, these are tied into 
physical integrity rights as fundamental liberties that one should expect by virtue 
of the quality of being human.  Finally, social and economic rights represent the 
newest frontier of rights theory. While these rights seem to be too idealistic or too 
broad to make into policy, actions such as the Affordable Care Act and the push 
for higher minimum wage as a right represent valid attempts to normalize this 
aspect of human rights.    
Globalization and its Influence on Human Rights 
Integration of national economies and of information have functioned to 
make the world a more local place than it was mere decades ago.  At the 
international level, economies of nations are intertwined and dependent on one 
another. The stability or instability of one nation’s economy can greatly impact 
the economic functions of other nations around the world. Corporations are no 
longer limited to operations in a single state.  Instead, they operate simultaneously 
out of numerous nations and do business around the world. Economics are not the 
only factor leading to the integration of the world community.  Information 
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technology has proliferated tremendously in the past few decades through 
mediums such as the internet and satellite television.  Today, it is possible for any 
person in practically any nation on the planet to communicate with others around 
the globe instantaneously.  The amalgamation of these uniting forces is 
globalization and its impact have tremendous implications for many facets of 
political reality, especially when considering human rights.  Thus, globalization 
operates at two levels which are to be addressed. First, there is the integration of 
national economies and second there is the advancement and proliferation of 
information and technology.   
Many theorists posit that economic globalization has some type of an 
effect upon how a particular nation recognizes the rights of its citizens, there is a 
disagreement between scholars and researchers as to whether that effect is 
positive or negative. Voluminous amounts of research have been conducted to 
ascertain where there is even any statistical relationship between a country’s level 
of economic integration into the world economy and its recognition of human 
rights. The results of empirical testing of liberal theory are equally divided in 
determining whether globalization and FDI in developing nations is conducive to 
human rights integrity in recipient nations.    Blanton and Blanton38, Harrelson-
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Stephens and Callaway39, and Meyer40 argue that economic globalization and 
human rights integrity are positively related.  In contrast, Abouharb and 
Cingranelli find that structural adjustment programs increase the likelihood of 
physical integrity rights violations, and Li and Reuveny41 assert that economic 
globalization actually hinders democratization in integrating nations.   
 Many political theorists have offered a liberal theoretical perspective to 
understand the relationship between economic integration and human rights 
infractions by the state as they understand it.  The central proposition of the 
liberal theoretical approach is that the greater the extent to which a nation is 
economically integrated into the world economic system the more likely that the 
government of that particular country will grant and ensure basic human rights to 
its citizens; therefore, for liberals, globalization is a beneficial factor for the 
achievement and recognition of basic fundamental human rights.42 From the 
liberal perspective, a positive relationship is produced between the independent 
and dependent variables; that is, as economic globalization increases, so too does 
the level of human rights recognition in a country.  First, the level of 
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interdependence among states has been tremendously increased as a result of the 
process of economic globalization.  As a result of this increased interdependence 
among states created by globalization, the domestic policies established and 
created by governments (especially their policies regarding fundamental human 
rights) are susceptible to foreign pressure.  This foreign pressure is exerted on 
government policies through economic sanctions; therefore, if a state has become 
integrated into the world economy it is less likely that the government in that state 
will repress its citizens than if it were not heavily integrated into the international 
economy.  It must be noted that there is a substantial amount of anecdotal 
evidence for this argument.  Countries such as North Korea and other gross 
human rights violators are unlikely to be concerned with the threat of sanctions 
because they lack substantial economic ties to the global economy.   
 Globalization has also led to advancement in the power and simplicity of 
technologies and the diffusion of technology across the globe.  Technology which 
was once only imaginable is now in the hands of common individuals in 
practically every nation.  In many cases, the poor have access to cell phones 
which can take and send pictures or videos almost instantaneously. As 
globalization spreads and nations integrate information flows can be transmitted 
between nations with ease and tremendous speed.  Thus, a nation which is highly 
integrated into the global economic system, the liberals argue, will refrain from 
human rights abuses against the citizenry because of the speed at which 
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information of those grievances can be transmitted to the outside world.  It is not 
hard to imagine an individual in a repressive country recording an act of state 
violence with a cell phone and sending the information to others outside the 
country.   
Likewise, humanitarian organizations are able to use mediums such as the 
internet and the media to garner awareness of violations which are almost 
occurring in real time.  Consequently, if a nation is engaged in human rights 
abuses and the information of those abuses is spread to the outside world, pressure 
by foreign governments and other non-state actors interested in maintaining 
human rights are likely to induce the violating nation to alter its policies regarding 
human rights.  Third, liberals argue that global economic integration encourages 
the state to de-centralize its political and economic power.  As the state 
decentralizes its political and economic power it has a reduced ability to commit 
human rights repressions against its citizens.  Since the state is less able to repress 
its citizens because of de-centralization due to increased integration, globalization 
helps to strengthen human rights recognition and bring about a cessation of 
human rights infractions.   
   Blanton and Blanton, Harrelson-Stephens and Callaway and Meyer each 
make the argument that human rights and economic integration are positively 
correlated.  These scholars base their research in the theoretical foundations of 
liberalism. As wealthier, more developed nations invest more resources into 
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developing nations through FDI or through the placement of multinational 
corporations, wealth is spread throughout the nation and people are enriched due 
to the diffusion of capital.43 44 As wealth increases, individuals, especially 
women, are able to become more educated, afford better healthcare for 
themselves and their children, and are able to influence the government for 
stronger civil and political rights.45  Blanton and Blanton ask a slightly different 
research question than Meyer and Harrelson-Stephens and Callaway.  They ask 
whether nations that have higher levels of human rights recognition will attract 
FDI. As a result of their analysis, they find that, “countries with greater respect 
for personal integrity rights tend to attract significantly higher levels of FDI.”46 
Investors are interested in the reputational gains obtained from investing in a 
nation that respects the rights of its citizens, and more importantly, those nations 
that respect the human rights of its citizens tend to have a more educated 
workforce.47  Scholars such as these, who advocate that investment and human 
rights share a strong positive relationship, maintain that multinational and foreign 
economic integration into developing nations is horizontal rather than vertical.  As 
foreign actors invest in developing nations, the benefit of the integration is 
extended outward and all of the citizenry is benefited.  
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 Not all political scholars believe that globalization has a positive and 
beneficial impact upon whether a nation guarantees and recognizes the 
fundamental rights of its citizens.  Many political and social scholars maintain 
that economic globalization, in fact, has a negative impact on the state’s 
willingness to guarantee basic human rights.  The central proposition of this 
theoretical perspective of economic globalization is that the greater the extent to 
which a country has economically integrated itself into the global economic 
system, the likelihood that it will grant fundamental rights to its citizens is 
decreased.  The relationship between the independent variable, economic 
globalization, and the dependent variable, recognition of human rights, is 
negative.  Scholars arguing against the traditional liberal theoretical approach 
assert that economic globalization promotes the development of authoritarian 
regimes which are necessary to provide stability to the political environment for 
the trading practices of multinational corporations.  Authoritarian regimes are 
better suited over democratic governments to implement domestic pro-market 
policies which aid the integration of domestic economies into the larger 
international economy. Why should this necessarily be the case? Economic 
globalization creates winners and losers and those who are hurt economically by 
globalization tend to demand protection from their government.  In the face of 
protests and demonstrations against pro-market reforms, democratic governments 
are likely to acquiesce to the protesters and offer protection to industries because 
of their electoral vulnerability.  In a democratic state, if voters are unhappy with a 
35 
 
policy, they respond by voting the policy makers out of office.  Unlike democratic 
governments, authoritarian governments lack the electoral vulnerability of their 
democratic counterparts and can effectively quell any protests which might arise.  
Since there is no accountability to the citizenry, authoritarian regimes are able to 
use severe means to cease any public unrest concerning governmental policy.  
These authoritarian governments are also the most likely to regularly infringe 
upon the fundamental human rights of individuals.  Therefore, the process of 
global economic integration tends to prefer and favor a form of political 
leadership which denies human rights and represses the freedoms of its citizens.   
 Just as with the liberal perspective, there is a fair amount of anecdotal 
evidence which supports the argument that economic globalization is detrimental 
for human rights and democracy in developing nations.  For example, in 1953 and 
in 1954 the CIA intervened in Iran against the Mossadegh regime which had 
nationalized American oil company assets in Iran.  Furthermore, a year later the 
CIA was responsible for the coup d'etat codenamed Operation PBSUCCESS, 
which resulted in the ousting of the populist government of Jacobo Arbenz in 
Guatemala. Arbenz had attempted to institute land reforms which would grant 
peasant farmers arable land which had been the possession of a small contingent 
of wealthy individuals. After the coup, the CIA placed a pro-American military 
junta in command of the government. This regime, which was promoted by the 
United Fruit Company, brutally repressed the people of Guatemala. Similarly, in 
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Chile during September of 1973, the government of Salvador Allende was 
overthrown in a CIA backed coup which was promoted by International 
Telephone and Telegraph. This coup established the repressive regime of Augusto 
Pinochet which lasted until 1990. Under the government of Augusto Pinochet, the 
rights of Chileans were routinely and viciously violated.  
 Statistical analysis, conducted by Abouharb and Cingranelli and Li and 
Reuveny offer support to the counter argument that globalization is not a panacea, 
but is instead a force that dampens human rights and democratic goals.  In their 
analysis, these authors examine the influence of globalization and find that human 
rights and democracy actually suffer as economic globalization increases.  
Repression according to Abouharb and Cingranelli occurs in the wake of 
structural adjustment because the economy of the adjusting nation is harmed and 
the leadership of the nation is inclined to repress on all aspects of the CIRI human 
rights index.  Nations entering into structural adjustment face both internal and 
external pressure which leads to increases in torture, extrajudicial killings, 
political imprisonment, and disappearances.48  Further, Li and Reuveny arrive at a 
similar conclusion that democratic functions are curtailed through economic 
globalization.  As financial capital becomes more fluid and easily transferable, 
governments are not able to meet the demands of the public for goods. 49  Results 
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such as these offer a solid critique of the traditional appraisal of economic 
globalization.  Instead of bettering the lives of individuals through increased 
education, health, and political openness, economic globalization leads to physical 
integrity rights violations and lower levels of democracy within globalizing 
nations.   
 As the world becomes more deeply integrated, the effects of globalization 
on human rights have become increasingly strong and noticeable. As shown, 
globalization operates on two distinct fronts that have the potential to impact 
human rights levels.  First, there is heightened integration of economics between 
nations.  Second, and potentially more substantial, is the advancement of 
affordable technology and the sharing of information.  Much like a spider’s web, 
movement in one area are felt in another and the consequences of policy cascades 
outward like ripples.  Further, due to the advancements in communication 
technology, it is impossible for repressions of individuals’ rights to stay a secret.  
Every person with a phone or camera is a reporter who can broadcast his or her 
perspective to the world audience through the internet in a moment.  Because of 
the openness of information and the integration of the world economy, many 
citizens who would typically be uninformed about global political situations are 
actually educated.  Because of their connection with the world, citizens are apt to 
advocate for increased governmental policy that reflect stronger rights protections 
for individuals around the world.   
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Human Rights and US Foreign Policy 
 Policy-makers are responsive to their constituents.  Due to the 
proliferation of information and the integration of the world community, leaders 
in the United States have been compelled to address human rights issues as a 
matter of foreign policy.  With the passage of time, the role of human rights has 
functioned as a policy impetus as well as an outcome.  Human rights, therefore, 
has often simultaneously been the motivation of states to engage in foreign policy 
while certain policies are often said to exacerbate poor human rights conditions in 
a target state.  Even worse, it is often argued that uninformed, or poorly planned 
foreign policy endeavors can have the potential to create human rights violations 
as a second or third generation consequence over longer periods of time.50  Stated 
simply, policy matters for human rights and there is a documented relationship 
between human rights and multiple variants of foreign policy.  Economic 
sanctions are but one aspect of foreign policy, crafted for an individual and unique 
purpose in the scope of a nation’s foreign policy repertoire.  First, human rights 
can operate as an input for foreign policy initiatives and, likewise, a second option 
can be seen where foreign policy can influence human rights in another nation.  
Each will be analyzed in turn.  
Up through the mid-1980’s, a majority of the research into this question 
had concluded that human rights were, in fact, not a part of the calculus which 
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Congress considered in allocating aid funds to nations.  David L. Cingranelli and 
Thomas E. Pasquarello published their article “Human Rights Practices and the 
Distribution of U.S. Foreign Aid to Latin American Countries,” and found that the 
opposite was true.51  The results of their research which they obtain lead them to 
argue that the judgment of American leaders to provide foreign assistance to 
nations does include an assessment of the quality of its human rights practices. 
This study not only created a controversy in the academic community because the 
results differed from the status quo of previous research, but it also drew a storm 
of criticism over the empirical and methodological choices of the authors.  As a 
result, many critical responses which attempted to address the deficiencies of this 
study and obtain more robust conclusions were published in the years 
immediately following the publication of this article.   
In attempting their study on the relationship between military and 
economic aid and the human rights recognition level of recipient nations, 
Cingranelli and Pasquarello make many important strides toward making the 
study of human rights more of an empirical and quantitative endeavor than a 
normative one as it had been in previous years.  First, Cingranelli and Pasquarello 
differentiate between the decision to provide aid to a nation, or what they call the 
“gatekeeping phase” and the amount to provide to a receiving nation, or the 
                                                          
51. David L. Cingranelli and Thomas E. Pasquarello, “Human Rights 
Practices and the Distribution of U.S. Foreign Aid to Latin America,” American 
Journal of Political Science, 29.3 (1985). 
40 
 
secondary phase.  It is the second stage of this analysis, the amount which is 
designated for assistance, which has been frequently studied in previous research, 
the authors contend.52 Therefore, the transformation of this research into a two-
level analysis only helps to explain the intricacies of the relationship and the 
different processes which are purported to be occurring.  Further, Cingranelli and 
Pasquarello were tasked with quantifying human rights recognition and abuses if 
they desired to study their project from a quantitative vantage.   At the time of this 
analysis, quantification of a concept as complex and generally murky as human 
rights recognition and national practices had yet to be attempted by many human 
rights scholars.53  In quantifying human rights practices data for most of the 
nations in Latin America for the period of 1979-1982, Cingranelli and Pasquarello 
attempted to accomplish a very difficult task.  While their study was ambitious in 
its goals, there are many aspects where the merit of this research is deficient and 
requires significant revision and reevaluation in order to be considered 
methodologically, empirically, and most importantly, theoretically robust.   
First, their choice of only examining countries in Latin America appears 
rather suspect.  They maintain that an exclusive focus on Latin America is 
acceptable because there was enough variation to test their hypotheses.54  
Cingranelli and Pasquarello do not consider that this geographic region could 
                                                          
52. Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985, 540. 
53. Ibid., 540. 
54. Ibid., 544. 
41 
 
potentially be different from other regions of the world such as Asia, Africa, or 
the Middle East.  Therefore, simply examining cases in Latin America provides 
no solid ground for empirical comparison.  It could be that the proximity of these 
nations to the United States somehow impacts whether they will receive military 
and economic aid, and how much.  Essentially, from the analysis presented it is 
impossible for the reader to know. Steven C. Poe attempts to correct this problem 
of generalizability in his response to the work by Cingranelli and Pasquarello, 
“Human Rights and the Allocation of U.S. Military Assistance.”  Instead of 
merely looking at nations in Latin America, Poe includes a randomly selected 
sample of forty nations which are not within the region of Latin America and runs 
the same statistical analysis of these nations’ human rights practices and if, and 
how much aid is given to these nations.55  While this can be described as a step in 
the right direction, it does not offer the generalizability that a sample of more 
nations can provide.   
Following this criticism, it also becomes evident that the longitudinal 
analysis incorporated by Cingranelli and Pasquarello is not really that 
chronologically long.  Their analysis only covers Latin American countries for the 
period of 1979-1982, and other responses fail to correct for this design flaw even 
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though some mention this as a problem explicitly.56 57 58  There was some 
speculation by all of the authors who covered this topic that there would be 
differences between the Carter and Reagan administrations with respect to if and 
how much aid is offered to a nation with a certain level of rights practices.  With 
the simple sampling window provided in each study, it is impossible to make any 
solid conclusions and prohibits the corroboration of any theory which might have 
been constructed which concerns partisan presidential politics.   
Likewise, one is left wondering why Cingranelli and Pasquarello chose to 
exclude El Salvador from their analysis of Latin America.  Because of the 
uniqueness of El Salvador, they chose to omit it from the statistical analysis for 
fear that it would diminish the statistical significance of their results.  As both 
Carleton and Stohl and McCormick and Mitchell highlight in their rebuttal of 
Cingranelli and Pasquarello’s research, Jamaica could also be considered an 
outlier and could also be considered unique, however, the authors did not choose 
to omit this nation from their research.  Ultimately, it seems as if the exclusion of 
El Salvador was simply a matter of convenience in obtaining the desired results.  
When both Carleton and Stohl and McCormick and Mitchell include El Salvidor 
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in their analysis, they find that the significance uncovered by Cingranelli and 
Pasquarello evaporates and the results no longer hold any statistical significance.  
Therefore, it does appear that Cingranelli and Pasquarello were merely looking 
for any way to present statistically significant findings.  After all, readers rarely 
become excited over a conclusion resulting in null findings.   
There are also potential problems of bias associated with the data which 
Cingranelli and Pasquarello utilize to measure human rights practices and 
recognition.  The authors use State Department data which they argue is useful for 
this analysis despite the fact that it might be biased either for or against certain 
nations contingent upon their relations with the United States.  Still, the authors 
argue that this data is still acceptable since this is the data and information which 
members of Congress will utilize to inform their decisions regarding financial 
assistance and the human rights policies held by the nations in consideration.  All 
of the authors responding to this initial analysis attempt to correct for this problem 
by using not only the State Department data originally used by Cingranelli and 
Pasquarello but also other measures of human rights from sources such as 
Freedom House and Amnesty International.59 60 61   The incorporation of these 
sources of data serve as a comparison to see if one data set is, in fact, biased, and 
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also to add a degree of robustness to any findings which refute the null 
hypothesis.   
 Emilie Hafner-Burton presents a somewhat similar argument about 
American and European incentives to engage in free trade with different regions 
of the world.  She traces the evolution of American and European humanitarian 
standards within free trade agreements.  Further, she argued that these standards 
are not mere window dressings that only serve protectionist interest within the 
United States and Europe but that these human rights stipulations have actually 
caused observable benefits for the human rights of those residing in trading 
partner nations.  Both American and European lawmakers have passed laws 
limiting those states which are eligible for preferential trade agreements.  Hafner-
Burton maintains that the advances in human rights recognition has been 
substantial with many nations advancing beyond their initial commitment to 
rights.62 63  Even nations that have a lengthy record of violations have shown 
signs of progress and reform due to their attempt to join preferential trade 
agreements with Europe and the West. Turkey is a prime example of a nation that 
has advanced its rights record in an attempt to join the European Union.64   While 
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it has instituted some reforms in an attempt to join the European Union, its human 
right record works against what democratic institutions it has.  Although, Turkish 
officials are quick to dispel current or past human rights violations as cause for 
the delay in European Union membership and instead rely upon cultural 
distinctions.65   Whether or not these assertions are correct on the part of Turkey, 
it cannot be denied that the human rights record of Turkey leaves a great deal to 
be desired.   
China, most significantly, poses a serious challenge to Hafner-Burton’s 
arguments and findings.  The powerful Asian state does not have a good 
humanitarian track record, yet both the United States and Europe are forced to 
trade with the global giant.  With China commanding such global economic 
might, there is no other option but to trade with China regardless of political, 
civil, economic, and social violations of human rights.  China’s power also 
threatens to undermine the ability of the West to force their requirements of good 
humanitarian policy on the rest of the world.  Those nations believing that they 
cannot implement human rights standards, or simply not willing implement 
radical changes now have a viable alternative to seeking out preferential trade 
with the United States and Europe.  Yet, China is hardly democratic in 
governance.  Economic sanctions leveraged at the Chinese government might 
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influence human rights conditions to deteriorate, however, not likely for the same 
reason that would occur within a democracy.   
Within the context of global politics, human rights occupy an interesting 
space of being both a cause and effect of American foreign policy actions.  In 
choosing which nations to engage in trade and aid agreements, the human rights 
levels within the partner nation are frequently assessed.  Further, due to the 
impact of globalization, it is politically difficult for leaders in the United States 
and other democratic states to implement agreements with states that 
systematically violate the rights of their populations because the political cost.  
The converse is also shown to be true, that human rights are impacted by foreign 
policy.  Deeper integration into the world system often strengthens human rights 
norms.  Through repeated iterations of interactions and the spread of values, 
human rights levels are increased.  This holds true about many different variations 
of human rights, from physical integrity through to social and economic rights.    
Human Rights as the End of State Sovereignty? 
Intervention into the affairs of a nation is arguably one of the strongest 
foreign policy options that any state can exercise. One of the most currently cited 
reasons for usurping the sovereignty of a nation and intervening in some form is 
for violation of human rights standards.  Traditionally, states would only face 
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military intervention if the rights of white Christians were repressed.66  The 
salience of human rights as an impetus for intervention spread as the application 
of human rights was recognized as belonging to all groups of people despite 
nationality, race, or religion.  Both Martha Finnemore and Wayne Sandholtz 
argue that humanitarian intervention has become more commonplace in the latter 
portion of the twentieth century, especially in the wake of the Cold War and the 
collapse of the Soviet Union.67 68   Further, it is almost politically compulsory that 
nations in the international system intervene to prevent human rights abuses.69  
Wayne Sandholtz in his essay Humanitarian Intervention: Global 
Enforcement of Human Rights? assessed the subject of the forceful intervention 
into a sovereign nation for humanitarian reasons. Sandholtz asserts that ever since 
the Treaty of Westphalia, the state is the highest form of authority.  Further, each 
state is sovereign and no other state has the authority to declare what is acceptable 
or permissible within the borders of another state.  That was, however, until the 
twentieth century and the establishment of supra-national organizations such as 
the United Nations. Now, through world consensus, which has become far easier 
after the Cold War, there are legitimate motivations for violating the sovereignty 
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of another state.  Sandholtz argued that there are necessary conditions which 
make the intervention of one nation into another for humanitarian reasons 
acceptable.  These conditions include, but are not limited to, the right of 
individuals to live a life that is free from torture, murder, and violence by the 
hands of their own government.70 Once any of these personal rights are violated, a 
gateway is provided for foreign powers to intervene with a legitimate use of force.  
These are only necessary conditions and not sufficient conditions.  What this 
means is that under circumstances when a government commits violence against 
its subjects that the door is only open for the possibility of humanitarian 
intervention and that the necessary requisite conditions have been satisfied.  It 
does not mean that forceful intervention is required or guaranteed by other nations 
within the international system.71   
American leaders and many of their allies have exhibited more willingness 
to intervene into the affairs of those nations that are seen as violating the rights of 
their populations. Davenport collected data for 137 countries from the period of 
1976-1996, dividing and assigning autocratic nations to one of seven categories: 
Personalist, Personalist hybrids, Military, Military hybrids, Single-party, Single-
party hybrids, and Complex hybrids. Davenport concluded is that single-party 
regimes tend to violate the rights of their population and repress their people less 
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than other forms of autocratic regimes.72  Davenport also concluded that military 
regimes are, “more inclined to use repressive techniques which are more directly 
within the realm of their area of expertise—physical violence.”73  Therefore, there 
is a difference between certain types of autocratic governments.  Of all the types 
of autocracies, Davenport concluded that single-party form is the least repressive 
and the least likely to institute policies of torture, murder, or forced 
disappearances.  This suggests, as Davenport asserts, that the United States should 
not seek to completely reform every government on the face of the earth into a 
democratic entity, rather, the United States should focus on intervening and 
sanctioning only those autocracies which pose the highest threat to the physical 
safety of people; that is, the United States should be slow to become involved in 
single-party autocracies, but more willing to intervene in military regimes where 
human rights are being violated.74   
Conclusion 
 Human rights are a concept which has experienced a strong theoretical and 
empirical emergence in recent decades.  While there have been massive 
conclusions derived through empirical application of human rights measurements 
there are still vast areas that are theoretically and empirically nebulous.  Often 
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research can be like a hydra, when one question is explored and answered, a 
multitude of new, equally imposing questions arise to the surface.  As has been 
discussed, the groundwork has been established for deeper more theoretically 
stimulating inquiries.  As a field of research human rights has evolved and grown 
in the sophistication of conceptual definition and in empirical measurement. 
Fundamentally, there are a number of variables which seem to offer hope of 
increased human rights levels in nations.  One of the most foundational is 
democracy.  As a nation increasingly transitions away from autocratic governance 
and toward a more representative system, the prospect for human rights abuses 
are reduced.75 Democracy matters when compared against autocracy, furthermore, 
more representative democracies are often more likely to support stronger 
protections for human rights.76  Ultimately, the goal of this endeavor is that by 
studying all of the various aspects of human rights, information can be supplied to 
policy-makers and activists seeking to aid individuals around the world.   
 When considering the full scope and breadth of human rights as it has 
been conceptualized, including physical, economic, social, developmental and 
other evolving formations of rights, it would be expected that democracies should 
have higher levels of each of these variants of rights, for reasons that will be 
further explored in the chapter dealing with democratic aspects of this analysis.  
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The most fundamental and essential realization of human rights are those of 
physical integrity rights.  Without basic protection of the body from violence or 
harm, it is impossible for development of any other aspect of human rights to be 
achieved or realized.  Therefore, the scope of this analysis will focus on the most 
basic of human protections and individual rights, the protection of the physical 
body from harm from the governmental authority of a state.   
 Further, as will be explored in the next section, there is considerable 
variance amongst democracies as well.  Human rights have often been explored 
through a lens of homogeneity (e.g. the outcome of foreign policies such as 
intervention, wars, or economic coercion).  Likewise, there has been a marked 
tendency to dichotomize the analysis on human rights, especially physically 
integrity rights, among autocracies and democracies.  But the question remains 
whether that is sufficient to facilitate the understanding of the full scope of 
physical integrity rights within a nation.  The next section will attempt to parse 
out the differences between democracies and establish specific fundamental 
concepts for variances within democracy itself that is necessary to conduct this 
research.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
HITTING THEM WHERE IT HURTS: THE ECONOMIC SIDE OF 
INTERNATIONAL COERCIVE DIPLOMACY 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, it was shown that there are foreign policy inputs 
that can influence and shape human rights levels within the nation that is 
receiving the policy.  Economic sanctions reside in a valuable middle-space for 
policy-makers who seek to alter the behavior or actions of other states.  In 
considering coercive diplomacy as a spectrum, where talk, rhetoric, and 
negotiations represent one extreme and full-scale militarized conflict represent the 
other extreme, economic sanctions are a middle ground option for policy-
makers.77 In one respect, the act of implementing sanctions can represent an 
escalation in the urgency of the diplomacy on the part of the issuer thereby 
sending information via a signal as to the importance of specific issues to the 
target and the global community.  For example, in negotiations with both Iran and 
North Korea, the United States commences their diplomatic negotiations, 
specifically over the development of weapons of mass destruction, with bilateral 
and multilateral talks and financial negotiations in the form of aid.  Upon 
President Donald Trump taking office in 2017, it became evident that rhetoric and 
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negotiations were insufficient to accomplish the policy outcomes which the 
United States sought within Iran and North Korea.     Consequently, the Trump 
administration reinstated the economic sanctions upon each nation and intensified 
their scope and severity.  In both instances, the attention of the leaders within both 
nations was captured, however, it is uncertain at this point whether the sanctions 
will be effective in curbing the militaristic interests of either nation or whether 
they will continue their pursuit of nuclear weapons and delivery systems.  That is 
a question for the efficacy of international sanctions as a diplomacy tool.78 
Further, it is unclear how the sanctions will impact the civilian population of 
North Korea.  North Korea is not a democracy, however, as will be discussed 
later, because power is consolidated into a central figure, there is the possibility 
that sanctions will trickle down and be absorbed by the population rather than the 
leadership.  Also, there is the propensity that even more extreme repression could 
follow the imposition of American sanctions upon North Korea. 
This chapter will be comprised of three major sections. First, it is 
necessary to begin with an assessment of what comprise economic sanctions and 
their purpose in implementation. Second, consideration will be given for the 
conditions under which an economic sanction is most appropriate as a policy 
option.  Finally, the effectiveness of economic sanctions as a form of coercive 
foreign policy will be analyzed.  There are substantial arguments over each of 
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these issues within the scope of the academic literature and each must be 
discussed in order to move forward with a unified theory that combines human 
rights, sanctions and democracy.  
Economic Sanctions: A History 
Historically, economic sanctions have been a primary policy tool for over 
a century, but they saw their maximum implementation in the 1990’s, often 
coined the “Sanctions Decade” by many scholars and policy makers.79  
Contextually, this trend makes sense with respect to Cold War political realities.  
In the bipolar world, the United States, or the West as a whole implementing an 
economic sanction against a nation would be ineffective at best, and 
counterproductive at worst.  Implementing a sanction against a country within the 
Soviet sphere of influence would hardly be considered reason for the target to 
change course because they received their financial backing from the Soviet 
Union.  On the other hand, if a nation was outside of the communist sphere of 
influence, issuing a sanction and destabilizing a nation could produce a regime 
that would seek out Soviet help and expand the realm of communism.  In the 
wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, the 
United States emerged victorious from the Cold War and the dominant political, 
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military, and financial actor in a new world.80  Sanctions, therefore, carried weight 
and their power was expanded.  Therefore, it is unsurprising that they were 
heavily employed during this transitional period in world history.  The conceptual 
framework of what precisely an economic sanction entails, and as an extension, 
their efficacy as foreign policy instruments must be addressed.    
Coercion with a Cause: The Purpose of Economic Sanctions 
Sanctions, as stated, are a form of coercive diplomacy. Sanctions are 
issued and implemented to elicit a change or alteration of some type in a foreign 
state.    While sanctions are not as forceful in their ability to coerce a target as the 
threat of military intervention they remain a significant and less costly policy tool 
which can be utilized by political actors.   First, the intention of implementing a 
sanction against another state will be addressed. Second, this principle will be 
applied to the case of the United States and Haiti, to show the purpose of 
economic sanctioning.  Third, consideration over whether the sanctions were 
effective in the intended purpose can be considered.  
Coercive diplomacy can be divided into three separate, yet related, 
categories: Type A, Type B, and Type C. Type A coercive diplomacy is intended 
to persuade a target to cease their actions short of achieving their intended policy 
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outcome.81 Consider the case of a pair of nations in which the government in the 
first nation is about to adopt a policy of which the government of the second state 
is in opposition.  The government of the second state might choose to issue 
sanctions, or at the very least, threaten to implement sanctions if the movement 
toward implementation of the policy is not abandoned.  This would be an example 
of Type A coercive diplomacy.  The Type B variant of coercive diplomacy varies 
only in that the intended goal of the issuing state is to persuade a target to retract a 
policy which has already been implemented.  In the example outlined above, the 
only difference would be that the policy which is the subject of scrutiny would 
have already been implemented rather than in the process of adoption.  Also, if 
sanctions are imposed upon a target state with the goal of Type A coercive 
diplomacy and the government obtains its goal, then the sanctions could be 
maintained (and most likely would be maintained) with the goal contained within 
the definition of Type B coercive diplomacy, to cause the target to reverse its 
actions.  Finally, those states which engage in Type C coercive diplomacy seek to 
dismantle the political leadership in a target state and force them out of power in 
favor of a new government without an escalation to war.82  Type C coercive 
diplomacy is clearly the most ambitious and the most difficult variant to achieve. 
After all, as Hans J. Morgenthau argued in the political classic Politics Among 
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Nations, actors are interested in maximizing power and, therefore, will be more 
likely to acquiesce when the issue concerns a policy rather than ceding their 
power and position.83 84 Clearly then, although sanctions can be homogenously 
described as coercive diplomacy, there are numerous distinctions within the 
concept of sanctions which can be parsed out.  These distinctions have proven to 
be an impediment to a uniform understanding of sanctions in the academic 
literature.  Much of the discordance can be traced to the debate over the related 
issues of what precisely a successful sanction looks like, and if economic 
sanctions are even effective as a means of coercion.  
As mentioned above researchers have tended to examine the issue of 
economic sanctions by whether they are successful in the ambition which they 
were implemented to achieve.  When examining the landscape of the academic 
literature on economic sanctions it quickly becomes evident that there is little 
consensus among scholars who have examined the topic of the general 
successfulness of economic sanctions as a means of foreign policy.  Many 
scholars maintain that economic sanctions are ineffectual for their intended 
purpose. In contrast, there are many scholars who have findings which suggest 
that economic sanctions do work in a variety of manners. 
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The 1990’s was a period in which there was a tremendous increase in the 
number of sanctions as opposed to the number in previous decades.  In fact, this 
increase was so dramatic that scholars analyzing sanctions termed this period as 
the “sanctions decade.”85  Therefore, anyone who wishes to select individual 
cases to examine the consequences of sanctions can select from a plethora of 
cases which are from diverse corners of the world, and just as crucial, they are 
somewhat recent allowing the researcher to look at incidents which occurred in 
the past two decades.  Although there are many recent cases which researchers 
can draw from to study and analyze the various dynamics of sanctions, the case of 
sanctions which were imposed against the military junta by the United States has 
been especially appealing to researchers who desire to understand sanctions.  It 
should be noted that the point here is not to conduct a qualitative case study on 
Haiti and the sanctions which were imposed against the military junta, or any 
other nation or regime for that matter, but to consider the results and the 
conclusions of scholars who have chosen to study the many facets of the 
sanctioning process through the lens of Haiti in the early to mid-1990’s. The case 
of Haiti can lead to two different conclusions regarding the success of economic 
sanctions as a means of coercing foreign regimes.  
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First, it could be concluded that the sanctions were ineffectual and that it 
was the threat of military intervention which prompted the junta to return power 
to President Jean-Bertrand Aristide.  The logic of this argument is clear.  
Multilateral economic sanctions were imposed by both the United States and the 
United Nations upon Haiti very shortly after the coup which displaced Aristide 
from power and the junta did not cede power back to Aristide until it was 
abundantly clear that the United States had deployed troops and was ready to act 
militarily. As Elizabeth Gibbons states, “The ‘preponderance of evidence’ points 
unmistakably to sanctions’ disastrous impact on the Haitian economy and the 
welfare of ordinary, innocent citizens, even as they left their military target 
virtually unscathed.”86  From this perspective, one can see that it was not the 
sanctions which led to the return of Aristide to power in 1994, it was the looming 
reality that the United States was about to imminently intervene into Haiti.   
Second, multilateral economic sanctions were in fact effective in their goal 
of removing the governing junta from power.  Bartilow argues that the economic 
sanctions worked to destabilize and fractionalize the ruling elite in Haiti over the 
course of the years during which they were in effect.  Bartilow reports that, 
“Researchers from the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research 
(UNIDIR) concluded that the Haitian junta’s decision to cede power peacefully 
was largely due to the ways in which tighter sanctions weakened the military 
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leaders will to resist American forces.”87 Thus, economic sanctions can be 
effective in their goal, from attempting to change policies to the alternation of 
power within a nation, if the sanctions effectively target the ones who have the 
power and ability to implement the desired outcome.  This is one area in which 
Bartilow and Gibbons are in concordance with their analysis of the case of 
sanctions in Haiti.  For sanctions to be effective as mechanisms of coercive 
diplomacy they must affect those who are the actual targets and offer some utility 
for conceding to the demands of the initiating state.  Thus, both authors argue for 
a re-evaluation of sanctioning policies because their effectiveness is contingent 
largely upon who in the target nation bears the burden of the sanction.  Sanctions 
must be targeted in their implementation so that the leaders are unable to sidestep 
the costs of the sanctions or simply pass the punishment down upon the 
population.  Three distinct ideas have been assessed here.  First, the conditions 
over which a sanction might be implemented and instituted were highlighted.  
Subsequently, these principles were applied to the American interaction with 
Haiti during the period of junta governance.  Third, and finally, it was considered 
whether the sanctions in that case were effective in their stated goal. Each of these 
ideas is fundamental for the understanding of how, why and when nations are apt 
to attempt to institute an economic sanction as a form of coercive policy against 
another state.  
                                                          
87. Bartilow 2001, 149. 
61 
 
Sanctions as Punishment: A Moral Approach 
In contrast to the familiar arguments such as those put forth by many 
authors concerned with sanctions,88 89 90 91 Kim Richard Nossal puts forth the 
interesting argument that sanctions are in fact effective.  But she argues that 
economic sanctions not be judged on their merit of achieving specific policy 
goals, that is, not for understanding sanctions as a form of economic coercion 
meant to force a nation to change a behavior or policy, but instead, sanctions 
should be viewed as a method of “international punishment.”92   Nossal highlights 
three motivations for punishing a regime via the sanctioning process: to compel, 
to deter, and for retribution.93  The first two, compulsion and deterrence seem to 
be synonymous with the general understanding of sanctions provided by scholars 
such as in Marinov, Ang and Peksen, Lindsay 94, and Hart Jr..  She determined 
that when understanding sanctions as retributive punishment that they are 
“successful” even though they do not bring about a change in the target regime.  
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The successfulness of the sanctions instead comes from their ability to bring harm 
to the target regime.95  In this regard then, sanctions which are issued in 
retribution as a form of punishment will always be “successful.” Nossal’s 
argument is not as concerned with the notion of coercive diplomacy in any variant 
and appears more focused on the act of inflicting harm.  Even so, this logic 
appears to be somewhat tautological, however, and not empirically testable.  If 
harm is also adopted as a potential goal of economic sanctions, then success will 
be assured, whether or not reform of policy is achieved then there can be no 
degree of failure.  In other words, the theory proposed by Nossal appears to suffer 
from a lack of falsifiability.  Therefore, since the argument espoused by Nossal is 
a tautology, her theory cannot be accepted.   This article serves as corroboration 
that while there is conceptual agreement over what comprises a sanction, 
economic or otherwise, there is disharmony in the field over what can be 
considered and measured as a successful sanction.  The work of Nossal highlights 
that researchers are actively working to establish an accepted definition of a 
victory of the sanctioning process.   
The Efficacy and Unintended Consequences of Economic Sanctions 
While it is possible that there is an implicit desire of the policy-initiator to 
inflict a deep and personal harm upon the recipient of an economic sanction, it 
seems more likely that there is a policy outcome that is desired instead. 
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Researchers look to see under what conditions economic sanctions can be 
expected to work.96 97 98 99 100 101  Two different interpretations of a successful 
sanction are offered in the literature.  First, there is a direct success in which the 
clearly outlined goals and motives of the sanction are achieved via planned 
mechanisms.  Second, sanctions might be considered indirectly successful where 
the explicit goals are not obtained, however, other more nebulous goals are 
obtained and achieved.    
These researchers tend to examine the economic, social, and political 
pressure upon the political leadership of a target regime which will result from the 
sanctioning process.  Ang and Peksen offer an understanding of economic 
sanctions which focuses upon the salience of issues to both the issuing and the 
target regime.  The hypotheses which they test are actually quite simple at an 
intuitive level.  The likelihood of the success of a sanction is determined by the 
issue’s importance from the perspective regime.  If an issuing regime deems an 
issue important it is likely to endeavor to see that the policy or behavior is 
changed to more closely align with their desired status, thereby increasing the 
probability of a successful outcome.  Likewise, if a target regime holds an issue as 
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especially important it will adamantly resist despite the sanction, thus lowering 
the likelihood of sanction success .102 Marinov  concludes that sanctions are 
successful, in that they destabilize the leaders of nations which have been 
targeted, yet the degree of destabilization is contingent upon the severity of the 
sanction and the domestic factors such as resources, and the health of the national 
economy.103  He finds that leaders whose nations have been subject to sanctions 
are more likely to be removed from power and replaced.  Subsequently, upon the 
arrival of new leadership, the sanctions tend to be lifted.104  Much like the 
research by Ang and Peksen, and to some degree Bartilow, Marinov does account 
for issue salience by arguing that leaders self-select themselves into sanction 
groups.105  Leaders of states such as North Korea, Iraq (under Saddam Hussein), 
and Cuba, will ignore sanctions because they deem the reasons for the sanctions 
as more important than the sanctions themselves.  The issue of selection effects 
highlights the importance of establishing a good measure to observe economic 
sanctions.  If a regime is averse to being the target of a sanction for any reason it 
might capitulate at the mere threat or whisper of a sanction.  If, however, a 
sanction is issued it might be that the target of the sanction considers the issue to 
be salient and will resist as much as possible, thus, lowering the effect of 
sanctions which are presented in the data.  Selection effects in measuring 
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economic sanctions could cause a bias, which if not accounted for could present 
misleading results.   
There does not seem to be any considerable, or vigorous debate over what 
is meant by scholars when they refer to economic sanctions. Sanctions, as shown 
through the research of Bartilow can be defined as coercive diplomacy where the 
goal of the issuing state is to achieve a specific goal ranging from the 
abandonment of a certain policy to the removal of political leadership.106  Much 
of the debate arises when discussing why the sanctions were imposed upon a 
target, and whether they are successful in achieving their goals.  Sanctions, as 
described in detail above, can be described as the implementation of a policy 
which is intended to coerce the target state or regime to alter its behavior or 
polices in some manner which is desired by the issuer of the sanctions.107 108 109 
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110 111 112 113 114 115 116   Adeno Addis presented an interesting argument in his 
article in Human Rights Quarterly, that the modification of behavior cannot be 
understood as the only intention of state imposing economic sanctions upon a 
target regime.  While coercing a target to alter behavior or policies is an important 
motivation behind the issuance of sanctions, leaders will also issue sanctions to 
distance their states from the “evil” which they associate with the target of the 
sanctions.  While Addis primarily focuses on the sanctions imposed by the United 
Nations Security Council this argument can be easily related to any state which is 
issuing sanctions upon a target.  Addis further warns that those who are issuing 
sanctions as a mechanism to distance themselves from what they deem as 
unacceptable actions from a particular regime run the risk of falling into the trap 
of exerting an “evil” influence themselves.117  It can be inferred from his 
argument that the sanctions which are imposed can actually be detrimental to the 
well-being of the population of the target state.  As Addis describes it, “the nature 
of the international community appears to resemble a drum (if you hit it on one 
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end, the whole thing vibrates).”118 The message is clear that the action of 
sanctioning will have ramifications not only for the target regime, but those 
within the population of the state, and even those regimes and populations which 
are near to the state which is being sanctioned.  Just as the waves of vibration 
move outward, so too will the waves created by the action of imposing an 
economic sanction.   
Conclusion 
Analyzing literature and previous research into economic sanctions has 
exhibited that this concept is deceptively complex.  The notion that a sanction is a 
mere act of “coercive diplomacy” is a vast understatement.  Contained within the 
concept of economic sanctions are numerous issues which if not accounted for 
will clearly impact the conclusions which are obtained.  For example, whether 
democratic nations in a dyad with a fellow democracy are averse to having an 
economic sanction leveled upon them and whether the mere whisper or threat of a 
sanction is sufficient to create a desired change can significantly bias the obtained 
conclusions. Also, it would be expected that nations which share higher levels of 
trade will be more averse to the notion of issuing economic sanctions against their 
trading partners due to the costs which they would be imposing on themselves.  
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All of these issues can bias and obscure the true relationship between sanctions 
and human rights, or other variables, which are actually occurring in reality.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ERECTING REPRESENTATION: POTENTIAL AND PERILS FOR 
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE 
Introduction 
 Following the invasion of Iraq by the United States in 2003 and the return 
of national sovereignty to the people of Iraq in June of the following year, the first 
national elections were set to follow shortly thereafter. On Election Day in 
January of 2005, men and women proudly displayed the purple ink on their 
fingers that signified that they had cast their ballot during the first elections held 
within Iraq in the post-Saddam Hussein era.  The 2005 Iraqi parliamentary 
elections were watched around the world and the process was touted as initial 
evidence of a blossoming democratic system within the former autocratically 
governed nation.  Elections served as a powerful and significant indicator that 
democracy was taking root within the re-forming Iraqi state.  Indeed, elections are 
often cited as one of the main facets of a democratic system and their importance 
to the legitimacy and integrity of a democratic government have been the source 
of many inquiries.  Although democracy and elections are often viewed as being 
mutually dependent on one another, there are a number of ways in which 
democracy can operate in a genuinely undemocratic manner.  First, many regimes 
that are autocratic engage in the process of holding elections.  Similarly, in many 
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states ethnic cleavages can inhibit the democratic quality of elections that are 
held.   
 In order to establish the theoretical significance of the relationship that is 
shared between democracy and elections it is necessary to first establish the 
conceptual definition and criteria of a democratic state.  Second, it is proper to 
consider the steps that must be made by nations to transition into a democratic 
system of governance or to strengthen their democratic institutions.  Third, it is 
essential to give consideration to the steps in the process of democratic transition. 
Are elections a process that is sufficient for a state to be democratic or are there 
other necessary aspects that must be in place? Finally, the literature must be 
analyzed to draw out lingering non-democratic tendencies that persist within 
democracies and how they impact the governing system of the citizenry.  By 
drawing each of these areas together, a more complete mosaic of democratic 
government can be exhibited. In understanding what is necessary and sufficient 
for democracy to develop, function and flourish within a state one can then 
examine the conditions that lead to failures of democratic governance and their 
ramifications.   Completing the portrait of democracy, and its potential 
shortcomings and non-democratic tendencies offers perspective on the manner in 
which human rights abuses can creep into the political culture of a democratic 
state facing an economic threat.   
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The Requisites for Democracy 
First, it is essential to commence with a discussion of what is required for 
a democracy to exist. Seymour Martin Lipset presents an analysis of the nature of 
democracy by accessing the conditions which he maintains are required for the 
stability and maintenance of democracy.  Lipset begins by explaining precisely 
why it is important to uncover the conditions which are conducive to democracy 
within a nation and he provides a conceptual definition for democracy, at least in 
complex societies.  Democracy, according to Lipset is, “a political system which 
supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing 
officials.”119 At its root then, democracy can be viewed as a system in which there 
is a legal precedent for a change in power of the government.  This does not 
mean, according to Lipset, that there must be a change in political power for a 
nation to be deemed a democracy.  Rather, there must only be the chance that the 
process of power transition be undertaken.  Opportunity arises through the process 
of some form of election in which individuals or parties vie for power and rely on 
mass public support to obtain their goal.   
In his analysis, Lipset divides the nations studied into two distinct sets, 
European and English-speaking nations and Latin American nations.  Further, he 
employs two separate criteria to determine which of the nations in these groups 
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are categorized as democracies.  Democracies in the context of European and 
English speaking nations can be identified through the, “uninterrupted 
continuation of political democracy since World War I, and the absence over the 
past 25 years of a major political movement opposed to the democratic ‘rules of 
the game.’”120 Latin American nations, by contrast, are merely determined 
through whether a, “given country has had a history of more or less free elections 
for most of the post-World War I period.’”121 The criterion for democracy in the 
latter is definitely more lax.  Nations in the Latin American category only need 
have had some semblance of elections in the past.  Election history need not be 
sustained or regular in these cases, but only occupying a majority of the nation’s 
modern history at the time.   
Lipset moves further and discusses what he argues are requisite conditions 
in a nation for democracy to flourish.  These conditions are also divided into two 
groups, conditions which concern economic development and those which deal 
with legitimacy. Most important, these conditions apply to all democracies, 
whether they are European or Latin American democracies. The conditions serve 
as generalizable expectations to all democratic vitality.   Lipset offers the 
hypothesis that greater levels of economic development and prosperity are related 
to higher levels of democracy in a nation.  Specifically, Lipset incorporates 
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income, level of urbanization, and education in the hypotheses which concern the 
economic requisite conditions of democracy.  Lipset also attempts to show that 
there is a correlation between higher levels of economic development and higher 
levels of democracy, as he chose to divide the nations into different groups.122 
Greater wealth within a nation has many benefits for states as a whole. Wealthier 
nations are more willing to accept and adopt democratic norms and values, 
distinctions of class within the nation, and to seek the reduction of nepotism in 
policies.123 Further, greater levels of wealth in a nation is also important in 
changing the shape of the social structure from a pyramid with a narrow upper 
class, to a diamond shaped structure where the middle class is the most 
prominent.124   
Finally, Lipset turns his focus toward the conditions of democracy which 
are associated with legitimacy.   Legitimacy can be achieved or maintained 
through a number of processes or events.  For example, as a nation is transitioning 
toward democracy, the legitimacy of the democracy can be bolstered through the 
support and continuity of existing social institutions.  Also, legitimacy can be 
strengthened by the determination of when new groups are allowed to enter into 
the political process. Therefore, if the electoral system of a nation is allowed to 
become increasingly competitive with the acceptance of new parties and groups, 
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then it is more likely that people will view the democracy as legitimate rather than 
a farce.    Finally, Lipset maintains that if a system remains stable for a long 
period of time, that the legitimacy of democracy in that system is increased and 
strengthened.  He fails to give a period of time but cites the United States and 
Switzerland as examples to corroborate this argument.   
According to Lipset then, democracies are characterized by an 
environment that is conducive to the development of a middle class and more 
importantly through the establishment of institutions that are widely recognized as 
legitimate.  Individuals occupying the middle class seek to ensure their interests 
through representation in the political system because they numerically represent 
the majority of the economic structure.  They reward political moderation and 
counter the power of political elites.  Legitimacy is obtained by the allowance of 
different segments of the population to engage in suffrage rather than fight their 
way into the political arena.125 By barring one segment of the population from the 
political arena, more extremist policy preferences develop within the ostracized 
group.  If entry is granted by some means at a later point, they will tend to have 
unrealistic expectations about what political involvement can provide, and 
therefore, view the system as illegitimate.126    Legitimacy, then, is clearly related 
to the electoral process in a democracy, and fostering an illegitimate system has 
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potential repercussions to the success and longevity of a democratic nation 
according to Lipset.   
Przeworski et al. arrive at a similar conclusion to that of Lipset with 
respect to the relationship between wealth and democracy.  After running a large 
number of statistical tests, and producing what they refer to as a, “forest of 
numbers,” the authors arrive at a number of central findings which should be 
addressed.  First, wealth and prosperity does not lead to democracy or facilitate 
the development of this type of governance.  Instead, the level of wealth of a 
nation is tied to the stability of the democracy.127  Thus, they state that, “In every 
aspect we have examined, the differences between poor and rich countries have 
been enormous.  For one, even if democracies do occasionally spring up in poor 
countries, they are extremely fragile when facing poverty, whereas in wealthy 
countries they are impregnable.”128   
In contrast, Foweraker and Landman have asserted that there is a 
connection between democratic performance and the level of economic 
development that a country has experienced. More specifically, the level of 
economic development within a country has been shown to have a positive and 
statistically significant impact upon the performance of democratic features of a 
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nation.129  Therefore, according to Foweraker and Landman, democratic function 
and performance could be enhanced and heightened by increased economic 
development.  In either theoretical approach, democracy and the economy have 
been shown to be intertwined.   
Movement Toward More Democratic Governments? 
The path toward democratization is a process.  Recent history is marked 
by periods in which numerous countries is all regions of the globe began the 
process of adopting democracy as a form of government.  First, consideration will 
be given for the massive amount of democratization that has occurred in Africa.  
In terms of transition, Africa has been amongst the forefront of regions that have 
made attempts to embrace democraticness. Second, the transition paradigm is to 
be considered along with the deficiencies that are inherent within the paradigm.  
These following sections offer a case and consideration for the principles at work 
within the process of democratic transition.   
Gyimah-Boadi presents a historical account of the movement of nations in 
Africa toward democratic tendencies.  According to Gyimah-Boadi, African 
nations have experienced a wave of “redemocraticization” which has significantly 
altered the political landscape in Africa in the last decade.  Gyimah-Boadi notes 
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five manners in which African nations have developed toward democracy and 
away from the legacy of authoritarianism. First, many nations have rejected their 
former constitutions which aided in the enforcement of authoritarian tendencies, 
and have adopted new constitutions which are more democratic in nature than 
their earlier counterparts. Elections have been held in many African nations which 
are genuinely competitive.  More importantly, in many instances incumbent 
leaders who find themselves on the losing side of the vote count are relinquishing 
power. Second, there has been a considerable surge in the availability of 
independent media in the form of television, radio, and in print.  Further, 
according to Gymiah-Boadi, the openness and availability of the media has helped 
to further the movement of these nations to more democratic tendencies. Third, 
connected to the idea of a free and developing media is the establishment of a 
flourishing civil society.  As people are becoming more informed, they are able to 
influence the direction of their state by holding their government accountable and 
remain relevant unlike those civil societies which were present in the immediate 
wake of independence. Next, as the “second liberation” has washed over the 
continent of Africa, there has been rejuvenation in the prominence and prestige of 
parliaments.  These bodies are working to keep the other branches of government 
in check and not revert to the practice of serving the whims of the executive of the 
state. Finally, there has been an increasing awareness of the legacy of corruption 
by those in power which followed the process of independence of African nations.  
Groups have formed with the purpose of exposing corruption.  The development 
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of these groups is connected to the establishment of a civil society, new 
constitutions, and the burgeoning media outlets in Africa.   
Gyimah-Boadi quickly curtails the optimistic outlook which is being 
presented and highlights the many deficiencies of the African shift toward 
democratization.  First, the move toward democracy has not been experienced 
evenly by all nations, and many of those nations which were moving forward 
have either stopped moving toward democracy or have undergone a reversal of 
policy. Next, both the parliaments and the constitutions which have hindered the 
prospect of authoritarianism are also under the threat of reversal in some nations 
where leaders have been able to maintain control over the nation.  Finally, there is 
the dilemma of weak parties which are still not responsive to their constituents but 
instead to those at the head of the parties.  Gyimah-Boadi identifies this as 
democratic transition, but not consolidation.130  Futher, these problems are not 
inherently African, but are instead typical of “immature” democracies.131  
Gyimah-Boadi concludes with an assessment of four challenges which exhibit 
how African nations are responding to issues given their democratic reforms 
which they have undergone in recent years.  These challenges include: state 
building, the AIDS virus which has deeply afflicted the African continent, civil-
military relations, and citizenship.   
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With respect to state building and the AIDS virus, the democratic reforms 
have established a more open culture, nations are attempting to rebuild their 
economies through neo-liberal economic strategies, and the openness of African 
society has brought international aid to help with the spread of AIDS.  Likewise, 
there has been a reduction in the military in many African nations, and as a result, 
a reduction in the coup d’états.  Finally, national and civic ties are replacing the 
ties of ethnicity in Africa, furthering the development of the private sector and 
civil society in Africa.132  It must be noted that Gyimah-Boadi tempered every 
comment about success with reasons why transitions have not been entirely 
successful or how they could potentially be reversed by old practices.   
 In a rather straightforward argument, Thomas Carothers addresses what he 
perceives as the fallacy of the current paradigm which dominates the academic 
understanding of democratic transitions.  With the onset of the third wave of 
democratization which began in the 1990s the transition model which was used to 
explain this trend reached paradigm status, and was accepted as universal.133  
There are five core assumptions which define the transition paradigm.  First, and 
most generally, any nation which moving away from a dictatorship is inherently 
moving toward democratic governance and should be considered in the process of 
democratic transition.  The second assumption maintains that there is an 
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identifiable sequence of events which constitute the transition process beginning 
with the opening, then progressing to the breakthrough, and finally culminating in 
consolidation.  The third assumption asserts that elections are vital for the 
foundation of democratic ideals, and the generation of further democratic values.  
The fourth assumption is that all nations can make the transition to democracy 
despite their cultural, economic, or political legacies.  In essence, the importance 
of these factors was downplayed in favor of analyzing the decision of political 
leaders to move toward democracy.134  The final assumption of the transition 
paradigm states that the “democratic transitions making up the third wave are 
being built on coherent, functioning states.”135  In other words, the process of 
transitioning is establishing new institutions in these states.   
The majority of Carother’s article is not spent praising the transition 
paradigm, but rather explaining what he views as its short-comings and 
deficiencies which appear when comparing the paradigm to the light of the 
empirical and historical record.  Carothers notes that the historical record does not 
corroborate the transitional paradigm.  According to Carothers, “Of the nearly 100 
countries considered as ‘transitional’ in recent years, only a relatively small 
number—probably fewer than 20—are clearly en route to becoming successful, 
well-functioning democracies or at least have made some democratic progress and 
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still enjoy a positive dynamic of democratization.”136 Instead, many nations are 
not dictatorships and are not moving toward democracy but are in a political gray 
zone.  Though there are many terms which can be used to describe the plethora of 
nations which occupy this gray zone Carothers condenses these nations into two 
categories, feckless pluralism and dominant-power politics. Feckless pluralism are 
nations which exhibit transition of power but the participation of the public into 
politics is largely limited to voting and the political elite are still corrupt.  
Democracy is essentially a façade and is only an ideal, but not realized.  
Dominant-power politics are systems in which the leadership is dominated by a 
specific group, which can be a family, individual, party, or movement.137 
Democratic Authoritarianism? 
 According to the criteria for democracy espoused by Lipset, elections are 
what qualify a nation to be considered a democracy. Elections are often argued to 
be one of the primary prerequisites for a state to be considered fully democratic.  
In North American and European democracies, which are established and 
consolidated democratic states, there must be no challenges to the, “democratic 
‘rules of the game.’”138  Within these democracies, the rules of the game are the 
constitutional requirements for the regular opportunity to change leadership 
through elections. Therefore, there to be considered democratic, there must be no 
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threat to usurp the constitutional provisions that ensure elected representation.   
Within Latin American, or transitioning governments, elections and the integrity 
of the elections are still essential to determine whether a government should be 
categorized as a democracy. To say that a nation that holds elections is democratic 
is not a sufficient criterion for democratic distinction.  Nations that are obviously 
not democratic often employ elections.   These states are recognized as not having 
either the capacity or the willingness to institute completely free or fair elections 
that are not influenced by persisting authoritarian legacies.  
In the wake of the Cold War, scholars began to analyze and discuss 
electoral authoritarianism.  With the United States standing alone as the lone 
superpower in the world after the collapse of the Soviet Union, states that had 
once been dependent on the Soviets for resources, protection and aid now saw 
their fortunes placed in the will of the United States.  In an attempt to ally 
themselves closer to the West many states began to entertain a shift toward more 
liberal policies.139    These so-called hybrid regimes occupied a somewhat gray 
area on the continuum between democracy at one end and autocracy on the other 
end.  They were not necessarily utterly autocratic due to some attempts to 
liberalize, yet leaders recognized that elections could serve as window dressing to 
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the rest of the world, particularly the United States, and thereby legitimize the 
regime in power.140   
Further, in moving from an authoritarian regime toward a democratic 
state, the former leadership of these nations are often not held formally 
accountable for their human rights oppressions which occurred while power was 
consolidated unilaterally.  According to Todd Landman, “Democracy is founded 
on the set of principles and ideas … but it is often the product of political 
accommodation at key moments in a country’s history and associated with 
notions of balance, possibility and working towards agreeable and peaceful 
solutions to conflicts of interest.”141 In many instances, it is advantageous for the 
democratic process to move forward in the implementation of democratic 
tendencies and not to exacerbate historical tensions.  There is also the distinct 
possibility that it is the authoritarian figure who is personally opening the 
government of the nation to the possibility of democratic reform.  In that sort of 
circumstance, the ability or the willingness to face accountability for past human 
rights transgressions will be low.  In this respect, democracy is disjointed and 
separate from human rights ideals.  Although it is considered nearly axiomatic 
that democracies are superior to autocracies with respect to human rights 
recognition, of all types, here is a potential area in which democracies themselves 
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can fall short of the goals and levels that have been historically established and 
internationally accepted.   
The Impact of Culture and Ethnicity on Elections 
 Going back to the example mentioned in the introduction of this paper, 
parliamentary elections within Iraq in 2005 also highlight one of the more 
pressing and nagging issues relating to electoral politics within democracies: the 
role and power of ethnicity and various ethnic group interests in casting votes.  
Iraq, like many other states, contains distinct ethnic groups which view 
themselves and their interests as distinct.  Within Iraq, a clear distinction appeared 
between the voter turnout of Sunni and Shia groups.  The elections occurred with 
only a small portion of Iraqi Sunnis casting their vote.  Harkening back to the 
criteria for a democracy established by Lipset, the legitimacy of the election was 
severely dampened by the low turnout of this prominent ethnic group.   Ethnic 
cleavages in electoral politics are deeply entrenched in many states and their 
prominence in the election system is often a feature of developing or weak 
democracies.   
 Ethnicity is clearly a salient force within politics.  Chandra offers an 
insightful perspective into the electoral operations of India and how individuals 
shape their votes.  India, although a democracy, is a prime example of a 
patronage-democracy where the state possesses jobs and resources within the 
system and is able to distribute these valuable commodities to those deemed 
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deserving.142  Because of the nature of the democracy which India possesses, 
voters see a major benefit in voting for individuals from their ethnic groups.  
Members of an ethnic group will work to ensure that the distribution of state 
allocated goods and services benefit the ethnic group which they represent over 
others within the electorate. Voters then make the decision to “count heads” 
within their ethnic party to determine whether their preferred party has a chance at 
victory in the polls.  If there is not sufficient support, then individuals will not 
vote for their preferred party choice.  Even if one prefers one party over another, 
if there is not enough support to get that party past the winning threshold, then 
voters look elsewhere to cast their support.   
 Ethnicity can also have a much more sinister relationship with elections 
and party promises.  In areas where ethnic cleavages have violent tendencies, such 
as in India, leaders can use protection from violence as an electoral tool.  In India, 
Hindu-Muslim relations are extraordinarily tense and often lead to riots and acts 
of mass violence.  In areas where the party competition is not especially strong, 
there is no need for parties to vie for the support of minority groups such as 
Muslims and Christians. As such, there is no incentive to offer state protection for 
these groups in the case of riots and ethnic conflict.  If the electoral competition is 
fierce rather than minimal, Muslims can use their electoral significance to ensure 
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that leaders recognize their security.143  Most significant from this analysis is the 
conclusion that competitive elections are not only requisite for democracy as 
argued by other scholars,144 145 but that the competitiveness of elections is also 
conducive to human security guarantees from the government.  Competitive 
elections not only ensure the vitality of democratic values, but also the protection 
of groups against violence. 
 In contrast to the arguments presented by Chandra and also Wilkinson 
which argue that ethnicity and culture impact voter turnout and choice, Jackman 
and Miller seek to further the body of comparative body of literature by 
examining and testing two competing theories which offer an explanation of voter 
turnout in industrialized democracies. The first of these competing theories insists 
that it is institutions, not ethnicity or culture, which influences voter turnout. The 
second theory, on the other hand, asserts that it is culture which is responsible for 
voter turnout and not institutions.   They extend a previous dataset used by 
Jackman to analyze the effect of institutions on voter turnout.  The original data 
set used by Jackman included 19 cases and focused on the years 1960-1980. Their 
expansion to the data includes adding three significant cases, Greece, Portugal, 
and Spain; and they also extend the time period of the data outward, including 
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cases up to the year 1990.  These three cases are important to the sample because 
they are newly formed democracies with authoritarian histories, and as such, can 
be used to provide evidence for one theoretical argument over the other.  If the 
cultural theory is explaining voter turnout, then it would be expected that voter 
turnout in these three nations would be low. If it is institutions which explains 
voter turnout then the turnout should be higher.146   
 Jackman and Miller then cite five institutional factors which influence 
voter turnout.  The first factor is nationally competitive elections.  The more 
nationally competitive the districts within a nation, the higher the rate of voter 
turnout is expected to be.  The second factor is electoral proportionality.  Since 
higher disproportionality in systems are likely to make many feel like they are 
wasting their vote by casting it for a minority party.  Thus, the higher the 
proportionality in the nation, the higher the expected voter turnout.  Third, the 
number of parties is also important.  A system with many parties which form 
coalitions can lower turnout because voters feel disconnected from the 
government which is established.  Fourth, unicameralism is expected to boost 
turnout since there is more legislative decisiveness associated with this system.  
Finally, mandatory voting laws are assessed.  Since there are often no real 
penalties associated with these laws, it is not expected that these laws will 
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significantly influence voter turnout.  The authors implement a statistical model to 
test the two divergent theories, and find that it is the institutional model which 
most adequately explains the turnout trend which is occurring in industrialized 
democracies.  Further, the institutional theory explains the three additional cases 
which had authoritarian pasts better than the cultural theoretical explanation. 
Elections as Steps in a Process 
 Thus far, it has been shown how elections can be used in an undemocratic 
manner. Authoritarian leaders can manipulate and respond to violence to serve 
their electoral needs.147 In a similar manner, authoritarian leaders might use 
undemocratic elections as a form of window dressing to accommodate Western 
preferences and obtain international legitimacy for the current regime. 148 149  
These arguments would lead one to believe that while there is little hope for 
democracy to truly consolidate in these transitioning cases.  After all, if the status 
quo of holding uncompetitive elections is sufficient for obtaining international 
and domestic goals there is no incentive to change course and liberalize beyond a 
minimal threshold.  Democratic transition in these cases would seem to be 
stymied with little hope of progressing further toward democratic consolidation.  
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Electoral authoritarianism could be the end of the road toward transition for many 
cases.150 151 
 On the contrary, elections and the process of electoral competition can be 
conducive for the advancement of a government toward democratic values.  
According to Lindberg, the actual process of holding elections cycles actually aids 
in the engraining of democratic tendencies and liberal ideals within the society.  
As a state undertakes the election process, even though the process may be flawed 
and not completely democratic, liberal norms and values are engrained into the 
society. Within African cases, which comprise the breadth of Lindberg’s case set, 
once the third electoral cycle occurs in a state, the likelihood of regime 
breakdown and regression into authoritarianism is extremely low.152  Thus, while 
initial steps that nations adopt through the offering of elections might be 
miniscule the process of holding uninterrupted competitive elections serves to 
improve the quality of democracy within a state.  
 Lindberg’s conclusions, while promising about the prospects of spreading 
and strengthening democratic norms, are obviously not deterministic.  In many 
nations repeated iterations serves to enhance the democratic values within a 
society. Yet, in some nations within his African sample, the nation did experience 
electoral cycles without improving the quality of democratic norms.  Cases such 
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as Sudan, Togo, and Chad highlight this phenomenon because they had “founding 
elections” but competitive elections were eventually eliminated.153  Thus, while 
Lindberg argues that elections serve to reinforce democratic values, it must be 
remembered that there are still cases which remain in the gray zone of polity, 
existing as a hybrid regime.   
Democracy and elections share a distinct relationship. It can be said that 
elections are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for democracy within a 
state.  States engaged in regime transition that are moving toward democracy but 
still retain many of their politically repressive autocratic features can, and have, 
held elections.  These elections are not free and fair, and the process can hardly be 
considered completely democratic.154  Elections can be influenced by ethnic 
influences and interests,155 156 and can also be structured undemocratically.157 158  
Yet, these elections need not be judged as isolated cases but rather as steps in a 
process toward true democracy.  As argued by Lindberg, elections offer states the 
chance to learn about the democratic process and to refine their politics toward a 
more representative status quo.  Even if authoritarian legacies or ethnic 
clientelistic tendencies persist immediately following the decision to hold national 
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elections, the process of elections offers a chance for values to be learned and 
institutionalized.  Thus, even though aspects of the election might be completely 
undemocratic and illegitimate, the eventual outcome can be liberalization and 
democratic consolidation over time.   
The relationship between democracy and elections appears deeper rather 
than superficial.  It is not correct to merely purport that a democracy is achieved 
through the holding of free and fair elections.  Instead, it would be wise to frame 
the relationship between elections and democracy as conducive where exercise in 
one area, the process of elections, leads to strengthening in the other, 
liberalization and embracement of democratic values.   Framing democracy and 
elections in this manner offers an optimistic perspective for those hybrid regimes 
beginning the journey toward democratization yet retaining many authoritarian 
tendencies.  With time and repeated election iterations, democracy can be 
achieved and consolidated even in situations where elections are currently not free 
or fair.  Therefore, in the example of Iraq, and the 2005 parliamentary elections, 
while the founding election was pivotal, more might be explained about the 
successfulness of democracy in this country by examining following election 
cycles.  
A More Nuanced Understanding of Democracies  
 Prevalent within the field of political science is the trend to dichotomize 
the type of government within a nation into categories determined by whether a 
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government is either an autocracy or democracy. Attempts to incorporate a more 
representative measure into studies often involve the polity score of a state.  This 
measurement, while offering a greater degree of variation than a dichotomous 
measurement still does not offer examination into the intricacies of the 
institutional composition of a state. By relying on a minimalistic classification 
scheme such as authoritarian and democratic, one is potentially suggesting that 
there is no importance in the composition of the democratic or authoritarian 
institutional structure of a state’s government.  Research in this line begs the 
question: are all democracies created equal?  Does institutional structure matter 
within democratic nations for the operation of politics, or can political processes 
be better explained by other features unrelated to institutions?  This paper will 
address some of the ways that differences in institutional composition has been 
theoretically argued to affect political outcomes.  
To Represent All, or to Represent a Majority? 
 All democracies do not operate in an identical fashion. Differences present 
themselves within the case of each democratic nation.  At the most basic and 
recognizable level, democracies can be distinguished between presidential and 
parliamentary legislative systems.  First, democratic governments might be 
described as presidential systems.  Presidential democracies are systems in which 
the government is run by an executive who is not responsible to an elected 
assembly and cannot be removed from office outside of election or malfeasance 
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of office.159 160  Second, governmental systems within democratic nations might 
also be characterized as parliamentary democracies.  Parliamentary democracies 
contain a legislative body which is above the executive, and where the power of 
the government is derived through coalition building and compromise between 
political parties to formulate a legislative majority.161   
Even with the dissection of democratic structures into presidential and 
parliamentary categories, some important differences remain which are crucial to 
the operation of politics within countries. Further differentiation between 
democratic institutions is possible, and offers a great deal of information about 
governmental features and the practice of politics within nations.  Arendt Lijphart, 
in his seminal study of thirty-six democracies around the world distinguishes 
between two models of democracy: the majoritarian, or Westminster model and 
the consensual model of democracy. Rather than merely assessing the legislative 
composition of a nation’s government, the majoritarian—consensual cleavage can 
best be seen as a spectrum that incorporates a wide variety of institutional 
components.162 In fact, in his study, Lijphart designated only three cases as 
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relatively pure majoritarian democracies:  the United Kingdom, New Zealand and 
Barbados; and only three cases as relatively pure consensus democracies: the 
European Union, Switzerland, and Belgium.163  The majority of cases that were 
examined fell somewhere in between, having traits of both the majoritarian and 
consensual democratic models. 
The Westminster model of democracy, is characterized by a leadership 
comprised within a winning majority coalition.  This system has two parties 
where leaders are elected via a plurality method. Lijphart warns that in majority 
democracies, “Competition and conflict also characterize the majoritarian model’s 
typical interest group system: a system of free-for-all-pluralism.”164  He 
continues, “Pluralism…means a multiplicity of interest groups that exert pressure 
on the government in an uncoordinated and competitive manner”165 Here, the 
interests of minority groups is a process of conflict with the ruling majority party.  
In the most severe cases of majoritarian oppression of political interests and 
competition civil unrest, disillusionment, or even rebellion can erupt as was the 
case in Northern Ireland.166 
Democracies following the consensus model differ in that they are not 
systems where power is dominated by a bare majority coalition.  Consensus 
democracy operates instead through disseminating power through sharing and 
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restraining processes.167 Coalitions are formed with the awareness that the current 
majority could be the minority after the next election.  Because of the fact that 
leaders in consensus democracies are cognizant of this fact, the processes of 
government are conducted in a manner that represent the interests of the entire 
population.   Government is strongly decentralized and is organized federally. 
Likewise, electoral representation is proportional so that even smaller parties that 
would be excluded from government now have a voice in legislative matters.168  
Not surprisingly, these multiparty, proportional-representation systems are found 
to be more conducive to public welfare than democracies closer to the 
majoritarian model.  Lijphart concluded his study with the determination that the 
consensus model of democracy was not statistically any worse at governance was 
typically “kinder and gentler” in its policies.  Consensus models perform better at 
representing all in society, including women; they also have higher levels of 
political participation, and political equality.169  As such, not only are consensus-
oriented systems just as able to preserve peace according the Lijphart, they are 
more inclined to aid in human development and the realization of more idealistic 
democratic values.   
Arguably, democracy works best within homogeneous societies where the 
interests and preferences of everyone can be adequately and equally represented 
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in government.  All societies are not homogenous and in many democracies there 
are cleavages that deeply divide the population.  Can democracy flourish in these 
types of societies where there appears to be no alternative other than a system 
with winners and losers? Lijphart, in his seminal volume , Democracy in Plural 
Societies: A Comparative Exploration,  advocates that yes, democracy can operate 
and flourish in plural societies.  Stability can best be achieved through what 
Lijphart calls consociational democracy.  This concept builds off of the consensus 
democratic model, but is applicable in segmented states, whereas consensus 
democracy can, and should be applied to all states.  The primary component 
necessary for consociational democracy to operate within a society marked by a 
significant cleavage is a grand coalition in which all segments are represented.170  
Secondary requirements for consociational democracy to operate are that each 
minority group must have a mutual veto power; likewise, elections and civil 
service appointments should be proportional in nature so that all segments of 
society are equally included.  Finally, federalism should be the standard so that 
each group in society has the autonomy to manage much of their affairs in a 
manner that ensures their groups interests.171  In attempting to engineer 
consociational democracy, a major requirement is that the government be 
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comprised in a parliament rather than a president and the government must also 
follow the consensual model.172   
Democratic Stability and Survival 
 Arguably, one of the most pressing questions related to the significance of 
different democratic institutional structures concerns the survivability rate of 
these governments.  With the emphasis to promote and foster the development of 
democracy around the globe, it might not be sufficient to encourage more 
representative governmental structure.  Instead, the institutional democratic 
format that is adopted might affect the long-term viability of the government.   
Presidential democratic electoral systems are often perceived as being rather 
brittle and fragile. In assessing the distinctions between parliamentary and 
presidential systems, it has been established that the overwhelming majority of 
stable established democracies in the world operate through parliamentary 
systems and that the only long-term success of a presidential democracy is 
contained in the case of the United States.173  First, presidential ties to military 
heritage must be considered.  Second, the analysis will move to the constitutional 
distinction between presidential and parliamentary systems.  Third, the impetus of 
an exogenous shock on each of these systems will be assessed.  Each of these 
ideas will help to form the theoretical distinctions between democratic states.   
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What then explains the distinct difference in the success rates between 
parliamentary and presidential democracies?  The primary argument concerns the 
legacy of military dictatorship which is usually present within newly established 
presidential systems.174 175 176 Indeed, presidential systems might be particularly 
appealing in these nations since the citizens are accustomed to a strong central 
executive figure rather than a large legislative majority composed of coalitions 
and groups.   Most scholars who study democratic electoral systems assert that 
presidential systems are more likely to revert into dictatorship if they fracture.177 
178 179 180 181   When there is a crisis in the government, it is extremely difficult, if 
not impossible to remove the president and attempt to establish a new government 
as is the case in a parliamentary system.  During a crisis the only solution in a 
presidential system is to essentially ride out the period with the current leader at 
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the helm of the nation.182  Thus, Stepan and Skach argue that, “Such situations 
often cause both the president and the opposition to seek military involvement to 
resolve the crisis in their favor.”183 The president pushes the border of his 
delineated powers in an attempt to solve the issue and can, as a result erode the 
democratic values and processes which lifted them to power.  Presidential systems 
have been shown to be more prone to collapse and reversion into dictatorial 
regimes.184   
This trait has been posited as arising through their constitutional 
framework which divides the powers into legislative and executive branches, and 
arguably more importantly, through the heritage of military dictatorship in which 
these fledgling democracies were conceived.  Also, shocks to the economic or 
political system can lead elected presidents in transitioning democratic regimes to 
adopt policies which are much more repressive and undemocratic in nature. G. 
Bingham Powell wrote that “The price paid for pure executive stability is a 
substantial one. The security of a minority president can suddenly become the 
domination of a majority presidency. Majority presidents can even replace a 
democratic regime when they are threatened, as happened in the Philippines.”185   
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Democracy can be a tool utilized to implement the realization of undemocratic 
political outcomes.   
Constitutional composition is essential to the integrity of democratic 
institutions. In a similar fashion to state constitutions within the United States, 
foreign democratic constitutions are more likely to be, “highly specific, to grant 
plenary rather than enumerated powers, to be amended or replaced frequently, and 
to be fairly unfamiliar to their publics.”186 As such, elected officials are able to 
utilize constitutional features to aid in the creation of a situation that is conducive 
to their individual political prospects.  Constitutions that are not entrenched can 
be amended to accommodate these goals, or worse, the public might be 
completely ignorant of legal provisions that can protect against political and legal 
overstepping by leadership.  
  Therefore, when an economic or political shock occurs and threatens the 
stability of a presidential democracy, a dramatic crisis is created in the nation.  
This crisis can arise in a number of ways.  Leaders facing the crisis will 
potentially fear that oppositional segments within the population will seize an 
opportunity of perceived weakness in the regime and will present a threat to the 
ruling government. In an attempt to maintain their grasp over the political power 
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of the nation, leaders will become undemocratic, instituting radical changes.187 As 
the situation deepens, violence intensifies and democratic freedoms evaporate.  
For example, in many nations, elected leaders have appointed themselves as 
“president-for-life,” or at a minimum, simply outlawed serious electoral 
competition in an attempt to maintain their level of power.188   
By contrast, parliamentary systems are not expected to react to a crisis 
within the political system in the same way because it is more difficult for leaders 
in these systems to individually assume massive amounts of power.  
Parliamentary systems require minimal winning coalitions and dependence in the 
legitimacy of the established coalition for the government to effectively 
function.189 190 Since one individual cannot easily assume unitary power, it is not 
likely for democratic tenets to be violated by a power-hungry individual or party. 
Indeed, anecdotal evidence appears to support this distinction between 
presidential and parliamentary systems.  
Analyses have shown that parliamentarian systems have a higher rate of 
survival as compared to presidential counterparts.  Why would it be the case that 
parliamentary systems live longer than presidential electoral systems?  According 
to Cheibub, “for the 1946-2002 period, the expected life of a presidential 
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democracy was 24 years versus 58 for parliamentary ones.”191  This point is also 
iterated in an earlier piece by Cheibub in which he states, “Indeed, existing 
evidence shows that parliamentary democracies tend to last longer than 
presidential democracies…The instability of presidential democracies has been 
commonly accounted for by the principle of separation between executive and 
legislative authorities.” 192  Therefore, when a crisis or threat to power arise that 
places pressure on the leadership of a parliamentary democratic system, the 
leaders are constrained by the legislative power which is inherent in the system. It 
is less likely that one individual or even a group of people will be able to change 
the structure of the system and eliminate the “democraticness” from governmental 
processes. 
Cheibub’s explanation for why nations previously ruled by military 
dictatorships tend to adopt presidential electoral systems is hardly satisfying.  
Instead of identifying the specific factors that led presidential systems to develop 
in states where military institutions were especially strong, he resigns and 
attributes this important phenomenon to luck, or as the case might be, misfortune.  
According to Cheibub, “My own view…is that the military—presidential nexus is 
the product of a historical accident: it exists because the countries where 
militarism remained strong at the middle of the twentieth century were also 
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countries that had adopted presidential institutions.”193 Each of the previous 
discussions, first the military legacy of presidential regimes, second, the 
constitutional distinctiveness between parliamentary and presidential systems, and 
finally, the response to economic shocks in the system underpin the expected 
differences in democracies with their respect to human rights.   
Institutions as a Source of Economic Growth and International Confidence 
in Democracies 
Governmental survival is obviously important for a multitude of reasons. 
One of the most crucial for success in a globalized and integrated world is the 
economic benefits that are derived by governmental and national stability.  
Nations that experience dramatic transitions to and from democracy are unlikely 
to be fertile ground for economic growth and international political and economic 
integration.  First, the credibility of more plural or proportional systems is 
considered as a sign of international confidence in their system.  Second, the 
constraints upon each system with respect to their credibility in the international 
system is considered.   
 Institutional composition is important for the economic prospects of 
democratic nations.   Ronald Rogowski subdivides democracies into either plural 
or proportional electoral systems. Rogowski looks at the reasons why trade 
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dependent states are typically proportional systems.194  According to Rogowski, 
“Trade-dependent, advanced economies, which are likely in the first place to 
experience strong pressures for democratic participation, will find it advantageous 
to adopt democratic institutions that maximize the state’s insulation, autonomy, 
and stability.”195 The states that best fit this model are ones that have proportional 
representation systems.  Martin accomplishes a similar task by looking at both the 
United States and the European Union, and arrives at the conclusion that 
legislatures in advanced democracies are actually conducive to the promotion of 
economic cooperation and credibility.   Legislatures do not relinquish the power 
to create agreements to the executive, but instead use their power to shape, limit, 
or prevent the agreement.  Thus, because of their involvement in the formulation 
of agreements, the credibility of the international agreements is more substantial 
than those that are achieved when executives attempt to circumvent the domain of 
the legislature.  
Similarly, Irfan Nooruddin  makes a familiar case for why international 
actors would be more likely to invest in particular nations rather than others.196  
The presence of coalitions in democratic nations serves as a credible signal to 
different external actors. Nooruddin is confident in his conclusion that credible 
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commitments spur economic growth.197  International credibility is derived when 
there is no one actor or party in power that can unilaterally and arbitrarily alter 
policy.  States where policy fluctuates grossly at the whims of one or a few are 
considered to have high levels of volatility and, therefore, lower levels of 
credibility.198  Because investors cannot be certain that their investment in a 
volatile nation is a sound one, they are apprehensive about dedicating themselves 
fully.  Governments with no constraints can change policy or reverse policy at 
will thereby stymieing economic growth.  In nations where there is not an actor or 
party that is able to willfully manipulate the policy process, investors are more 
likely to see the political process as healthy and stable for greater investment.199  
Although presidential systems can provide stability when under conditions of 
divided government, or gridlock, it is parliamentary democracies that perform 
best and experience the highest levels of economic growth.200  This argument is 
similar but not identical to the one made by Lijphart.  Lijpart argues that 
majoritarian systems, which are often perceived as being strong and stable, are not 
better at protecting either the economy or the civil peace within their borders.201 
For Nooruddin, the conclusions are clear.  It is parliamentary democracies that are 
better able to develop institutional coalitions and constraints that provide political 
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stability and, therefore, attract economic investment.  Thus, Nooruddin expands 
on the argument of Lijphart by showing that parliamentary democracies are better 
economic alternatives than majoritarian or presidential democracies.   
The Irrelevancy of Institutions: Clientelism in Africa 
Contrary to the argument that the institutional composition of democratic 
states is crucial in understanding such political phenomenon as stability, growth, 
and state survival, there are counter-arguments which suggest that institutional 
structure is not as important as theorized. Instead, adherents of this view argue 
that it is some other feature in the system that can better explain the level that 
these national attributes assume.  Within the study of African democracies in the 
last forty to fifty years since the end direct colonial rule, there is greater emphasis 
placed on cultural and familial factors than on the democratic institutions that 
newly organizing governments opt to adopt.  Two strains of literature will be 
considered in this section.  First, the propensity of patrimonialism and clientelism 
to infiltrate democratic politics.  This has been especially true within Africa, 
which as discussed earlier, has been attempting to democratize.  Second, there is 
the dependency argument, which dictates that stability is largely a legacy of 
colonialism.  In this respect, much of the failure to consolidate democracy rests at 
the feet of Western powers.   
In Africa especially, the coalition needed to maintain power is often 
argued as being manipulated through the practice of patronage politics rather than 
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consensual or majoritarian democratic structures. Schatzberg articulates the 
importance of clientelism in obtaining political support through the analogy of 
food and the importance of this to the people.  Schatzberg mentions that, “Voters 
standing in line to cast their ballots were tempted with two slices of bread 
surrounding several ‘tasty’ banknotes if they agreed to vote the right way.”202  
The lesson from this passage is clear, a sufficient winning coalition is often 
established in African nations through the distribution of goods such as food and 
even currency. Familial ties have also been used as an explanation for 
governmental policy outcomes within African nations.  Although not exclusive to 
the African continent, there is a remarkable tendency for leaders in sub-Saharan 
African nations to portray their role in relation to the populous of the nation as a 
father-children relationship.  Those who support the elected leader politically and 
more fervently are more likely to receive benefits and gifts from the father-like 
leader.  Governmental appointments and civil service jobs are perks of a 
patrimonial relationship bestowed upon political loyalists.   Clark C. Gibson 
discusses the economic role of wildlife in African nations as a source of 
clientelism.203 Africa has some of the most valuable and varied wildlife on the 
planet. As such, the hunting and protection of wildlife species is a valuable 
commodity.  According to Gibson, not only is the practice of clientelism 
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exercised through the distribution of licenses which allow certain privileged 
individuals to hunt these creatures, clientelism is also practiced through the 
appointment of certain individuals to jobs and positions within the bureaucratic 
structure.204  Government effectiveness in protecting these animals, and 
economically empowering certain individuals is a matter of party loyalty rather 
than proportionality as advocated by Lijphart.205   
Rather than formatting democracy in a manner that is representative of the 
consensual will of all the people or simply a majority of the population, political 
outcomes are the product of patrimonial relationship of getting votes for services 
and positions within the government.  Because of the prominence of clientelism 
and the power of presidents in African democracies, rare occurrences of 
institutional proceedings such as legislative elections and functions or presidential 
cabinet meetings come off purely as a matter of ritual and little more than a 
political “sideshow” that is played out for the public.206   
Another prominent argument largely emanating from the African 
literature, but still applicable to much of the developing world, asserts that 
attributes such as economic growth rate, political stability and other outcomes are 
the product of European colonial heritage. Recall that Europeans desired to 
extract the wealth from their colonies and export the products to their European 
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homeland. As a result of this legacy, Africans have not developed a strong 
manufacturing economy but have continued to export these products which can be 
controlled by a small group and can also be manipulated by certain groups to fund 
extended conflicts.  It is more correct, the authors argue, to understand conflict as 
a result of economic structure and not as a product of other factors such as 
ideology.207    
Although democratic qualities and values are often used to explain the 
outbreak of conflict and war some scholars have attributed this phenomenon to 
the enduring legacy of European colonization. Because primary commodities 
account for such a large share of Africa’s economy, these resources can be subject 
to predation by rebel leaders or government officials and can be readily utilized to 
fund and sustain conflicts and wars.208  Therefore, the enclave economies which 
resulted because of the capitalistic tendencies and interests of former colonial 
powers are adversely affecting the African continent through the present.    As 
posited by the World Bank, the authors assert that conflict deters foreign 
corporations from investing resources on the African continent.  The motivations 
for this aversion are similar to the reasons provided by the World Bank in their 
research report.  In nations which are conflict prone or there is a sufficient threat 
of conflict, supplies for production could be disrupted, or likewise, the finished 
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manufactured product might not be able to reach the global market place.  
Similarly, it could be that corporations fear becoming associated with the conflict 
in the eyes of the public, thereby harming their profits.  Leonard and Straus do 
offer some suggestions regarding policy which might help quell the potential for 
civil conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Their solution is that more developed and 
powerful nations offer their commitment to the regime and will protect it from 
any threat, foreign and domestic, as long as strides toward democracy are being 
made and human rights are observed.209  These types of commitments have shown 
potential in the past and they argue that if these commitments are extended, 
Africans will have greater autonomy to develop and truly be independent.  While 
contentious, these two lines of thought impact the prospect for the success of 
democracy.  That is, first, the tendency to implement cronyism and clientelism 
within democracy and, second, the inescapable legacy of Western colonialism.  
Conclusion 
Even when considering the theoretical and empirical arguments that 
maintain that institutions are largely irrelevant when compared to other factors, it 
is hard to dismiss distinct democratic institutions as the primary explanation for 
many political outcomes.  Institutional composition matters and is a significant 
explanation for a wide variety of research questions from the kindness and 
gentleness of democracy, to the credibility of a state, to the probability of political 
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survival of a government.  What does seem fairly apparent is that consensual 
parliamentary systems offer better prospects for success and human well-being 
than presidential or majoritarian systems, and that the consociational model of 
democracy is beneficial and should be employed within fragmented or plural 
societies.  According to Lijphart, one would expect that consensus democracies to 
not only have higher levels of democratic qualities than their Westminster 
counterparts, but also to be more interested in the social and economic welfare of 
their populations.210  Nations that utilize a model of democracy closer to a 
consensus formulation are more in line with the liberal values that most attribute 
with ideal democracy.  Finally, parliamentary democracies typically fare better 
than more presidential systems with respect to their stability and level of 
volatility.   
Ultimately, there are still questions that remain unanswered and are 
theoretically relevant and pressing.  Specifically, Cheibub identified a 
presidential—military nexus that influences the survival rate of presidential 
democracies.  He does not, however, articulate the causes that lead presidential 
democracies to be more likely to develop in nations that have a strong military 
heritage.  He believes that if it were parliamentary democratic systems that were 
chosen in these nations, that these systems would be just as likely to fail and 
collapse.211  This staggering trend encompassed within the presidential—military 
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nexus is theoretically and practically relevant and should be explored with greater 
fervor.  Likewise, the theory of economic growth espoused by Nooruddin can be 
applied to many different theoretical questions.  Where Nooruddin examines 
economic growth as his dependent variable, one could replace growth with 
military alliances, multilateral trade agreements or a host of other potential 
issues.212  
 Research into the dynamics of democratic institutions still has a lot of 
ground to cover theoretically and empirically.  More importantly, with the 
emphasis that the United States and other developed nations place on 
democratization, more emphasis should be placed on encouraging “smart 
democratization.” Rather than broadly pushing democracy, emphasis needs to be 
focused on democratic features, such as diffusing political power and building 
politically inclusive coalitions,213 214 215 which offer greater benefits to the general 
society and the durability of the government.216   
As highlighted throughout this chapter, the road toward democracy is not 
easily traversed.  Movement toward democratic governance requires the active 
involvement of both individuals within civil society and the stewardship of 
governmental leaders.  In that respect, it is insufficient to look at democracy as 
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either a bottom-up or a top-down phenomenon. Once democratic transition has 
occurred, recidivism is possible, and likely under certain parameters.217 Certain 
non-democratic tendencies are apt to persist, especially when the power of an 
individual leader is threatened and they have the power to ensure that their office 
is safe through a variety of political mechanisms. Typically, this decision is 
unilateral, without the consent of the majority and other branches of the 
government are silenced in their opposition to the move.  Theoretically, and 
historically, there are examples in which leaders have been inclined to use a carrot 
via patronage or clientelism to retain their office.  Such an occurrence, while 
diverging from electoral purity and integrity, does not have the negative human 
cost of other options.  In other cases, a stick might appear to be a more certain 
solution to solidify power and remove the threat of being ousted from office.  As 
stated, presidential democracies, where there is consider power isolated in a single 
individual, are more prone to revert to authoritarian tendencies and to use the 
mechanisms of the state to curtail resistance to their leadership.    
With the discussion over democracies and their features concluded, it is 
possible to synthesize the concepts discussed in the previous three chapters into a 
cohesive theory that combine each of their theoretical similarities.  Theoretical 
connections can now be identified and linked together because within the reality 
of the world, concepts do overlap and overflow into one another. Representing the 
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reality of the world demands that these conceptions be unboxed and removed 
from isolation.  Doing so will allow for a richer and more unified understanding 
of the manner in which domestic and international policies interact and affect one 
another.   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
SANCTIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS LEVELS IN PRESIDENTIAL 
AND PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACIES 
It is necessary to establish what the relationship between the impositions 
of economic sanctions and human rights integrity looks like within different 
democratic systems.  In other words, what is the causal connection between 
sanctions and human rights in different democratic systems?  Drawing from the 
literature and previous research on each individual topic, a connection can be 
discerned.  Governmental legitimacy can be challenged if the citizenry is affected 
by the imposition of an economic sanction because the people hold the 
government responsible for their misery. Governments, fearing an uprising due to 
public displeasure, are inclined to repress the citizens within national borders.  
Sanctioning usually inflicts a greater harm upon the general population, 
worsening the level of human integrity rights which are recognized within a 
nation.218 219 220    
At the most fundamental level of conception, sanctions are a form of 
coercive diplomacy. Sanctions are issued and implemented to elicit a change or 
alteration of some type in a foreign state.   Sanctions are not as forceful in their 
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ability to coerce a target as the process of military intervention; however, they 
remain a significant policy tool often utilized by political actors.  Bartilow 
explains the differing goals which sanctions can be implemented to achieve.  
Coercive diplomacy can be divided into three separate, yet related, categories: 
Type A, Type B, and Type C.  Type A coercive diplomacy is intended to persuade 
a target to abandon pursuit of a particular policy outcome.221 The Type B variant 
of coercive diplomacy differs only in that the intended goal of the issuing state is 
to motivate a target to retract a policy which has already been implemented. Type 
C coercive diplomacy seeks to dismantle the political leadership in a target state 
and force them out of power in favor of a new government without an escalation 
to war.222  Type C coercive diplomacy is arguably the most ambitious and the 
most difficult variant of coercive diplomacy to achieve because of the significant 
costs associated with removing a leader. 
For sanctions to be effective the issuer must have some capability to effect 
or influence the target through the sanction.  Therefore, a sanction leveled against 
the United States by a poorer and weaker nation is not likely to be as influential as 
a sanction issued by a stronger power against a weaker state.  Sanctions can also 
be effective if they are issued against a target of equal power. Since the majority 
of sanctions are issued by developed nations toward developing nations, it can be 
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argued that it is democratic nations which are primarily issuing sanctions. While 
there is anecdotal evidence of democratic nations such as the United States 
undermining democracies in Latin America and the Caribbean during the early-to-
mid-Twentieth century, most research would suggest that democracies are not 
prone to overtly attempt to force leadership change on another democracy.  
Therefore, due to shared democratic values, sanctions issued against democracies 
will be either Type A or B, with the goal of either preventing a policy or having 
the target retract the legislation after it has been instituted.   
 Presidential democratic electoral systems are rather fragile. The primary 
argument concerns the legacy of military dictatorship which is usually present 
within newly established presidential systems.223 224 225  Indeed, presidential 
systems might be particularly appealing in these nations because the citizens are 
accustomed to a strong central executive figure rather than a large legislative 
majority composed of coalitions and groups. Presidential systems are unique 
because they foster an environment in which:  
Elected leaders use the office of the executive to concentrate their base of  
personal power, marginalize opposition forces and undermine the quality  
of democracy itself. In such cases, democracy is not overthrown but  
eroded, and so-called strong men (and it really is men) seek to remain in  
office indefinitely through the manipulation of popular opinion and  
concentration of power.226   
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Most scholars who study democratic electoral systems assert that presidential 
systems are more likely to revert into dictatorship if they fracture.227 228 229 230 231 
When there is a crisis in the government, it is impossible to remove the president 
and attempt to establish a new government as is the case in a parliamentary 
system.  During a crisis the only solution in a presidential system is to essentially 
ride out the period with the current leader at the helm of the nation.232  Thus, 
Stepan and Skach argue that, “Such situations often cause both the president and 
the opposition to seek military involvement to resolve the crisis in their favor.”233 
The president pushes the border of his delineated powers in an attempt to solve 
the issue and can, as a result erode the democratic values and processes which 
lifted them to power.  Presidential systems have been shown to be more prone to 
collapse and reversion into dictatorial regimes.   
This trait has been posited as arising through their constitutional 
framework which divides the powers into legislative and executive branches, and 
arguably more importantly, through the heritage of military dictatorship in which 
these fledgling democracies were conceived.  Also, shocks to the economic or 
political system can lead elected presidents in transitioning democratic regimes to 
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adopt policies which are much more repressive and undemocratic in nature.  
Therefore, when an economic sanction is issued against a presidential democracy, 
an economic crisis is created in the nation.  This crisis can arise in a number of 
ways.  For example, certain imports or exports might be blocked or aid money 
might be revoked or suspended.  The imposition of the sanction affects the public 
through higher prices for imports or a reduced governmental capacity to provide 
public goods. Leaders will fear that segments within the population will seize an 
opportunity of perceived weakness in the regime and will present a threat to the 
ruling government.  
Thus, sanctions can create an economic crisis in the target nation which 
can present a challenge to the authority of the leaders. As a response, the 
government will respond with repression of all forms of human rights.  This 
includes both physical integrity rights and social and political rights.  The 
repression of all forms of human rights serve the purpose of preventing the 
organization of political opponents and the abuse of physical integrity rights as a 
message that any insurrection will not be tolerated.  This is the case even when 
there are not opportunistic groups within the nation.  Instead, repression is 
occurring merely because of a perceived threat assessment by the president of the 
target nation.   
By contrast, parliamentary systems are not expected to react to a crisis 
created by a sanction the same way because it is more difficult for leaders in these 
systems to individually assume massive amounts of power.  Parliamentary 
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systems require coalitions and dependence in order for the government to 
effectively function.  Since one individual cannot easily assume power, it is not 
likely for human rights to be violated by a power-hungry individual. Indeed, 
anecdotal evidence appears to support this distinction between presidential and 
parliamentary systems. Analyses have shown that parliamentarian systems have a 
higher rate of survival as compared to presidential counterparts.  Why would it be 
the case that parliamentary systems live longer than presidential electoral 
systems?  According to Cheibub, “for the 1946-2002 period, the expected life of a 
presidential democracy was 24 years versus 58 for parliamentary ones.”234 This 
point is also iterated in an earlier piece by Cheibub in which he states, “Indeed, 
existing evidence shows that parliamentary democracies tend to last longer than 
presidential democracies…The instability of presidential democracies has been 
commonly accounted for by the principle of separation between executive and 
legislative authorities.”235 Therefore, when sanctions are applied which place 
pressure on the leadership of a parliamentary democratic system, the leaders are 
constrained by the legislative power which is inherent in the system. It is less 
likely that one individual or even a group of people will be able to impose 
repression on the population since power is predicated in coalitional governance. 
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Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Two very salient questions arise from the previous research into human 
rights, democracy and economic sanctions. (1) What is the impact, if any, of 
economic sanctions upon physical integrity human rights in presidential 
democracies? (2) What is the impact, if any, of economic sanctions upon physical 
integrity human rights in parliamentary democracies?  
 Therefore, as an extension of the two research questions outlined there are 
two hypotheses which can be drawn from this theory.  First, economic sanctions 
on presidential systems will lead to more systematic violations in all variants of 
human rights (H1).  Second, presidential democratic systems will experience 
more human rights abuses than parliamentary systems (H2).  Analysis of these 
hypotheses serve as a test of the theoretical connection between the distinct 
concepts of physical integrity human rights, economic sanctions, and democratic 
institutional composition.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
CRACKING THE QUESTION: QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
There are a number of datasets that quantitatively measure human rights. 
Of all the datasets available, the Cingranelli Richards Human Rights Database is 
one of the most extensively utilized measures of physical integrity rights.  The 
database includes data on all countries from the period of 1981-2008 and contains 
individual measurements of numerous individual indicators of human rights 
components.  Specifically, it includes four variables measured on a three-point 
scale: torture, extrajudicial killings, political disappearances, and political 
imprisonment, each of which is coded from 0 to 2.236 A value of 0 indicates high 
or frequent abuses of these rights while a value of 2 signifies very low or 
nonexistent levels of these violations.  Further, these four variables are compiled 
into an additive index which ranges from 0 to 8 where 0 indicates no respect for 
any of these rights and 8 represents perfect respect for all the aspects of physical 
integrity rights.  
The Cingranelli Richards Human Rights Database contains an inherent 
feature in the coding that can cause some confusion in the presentation and 
interpretation of any results which are obtained.  The original coding scheme 
utilized by Cingranelli and Richards gives a value of 0 to severe and systematic 
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violation and 2 as no violation of these rights.  Keeping the variables in their 
original coding format can potentially lead to misinterpreting of the coefficients 
and misleading conclusions about the effect of the explanatory variables.  The 
inverse coding scheme which Cingranelli and Richards use is simply 
counterintuitive.  Therefore, it is appropriate to recode each of the measures of 
human rights so that higher levels of violations receive higher vales on the ordinal 
scale.  Therefore, a value of 0 now represents no abuse of the right by the 
government and a value of 2 indicates higher levels of abuse.  Coding the 
variables as measures of violation allows for intuitive interpretation of 
coefficients that are produced through the quantitative analysis.   
As with any analysis of a potentially ambigious concept or set of concepts, 
it is essential to have a clear and precise conceptual definition of the idea that will 
allow for systematic and exact criteria for measurement.  Political disappearances 
are defined by Cingranelli and Richards as cases where, “people have 
disappeared, political motivation appears likely, and the victims have not been 
found.”237  The difficulty in accurately coding the political imprisonment 
measurement becomes manifest when the ambiguity of political motivation is 
considered.  There could be systematic bias in the coding of this variable in 
certain nations.  Some nations might be especially adept at making individuals 
disappear without public knowledge, thereby biasing the estimate downward.  On 
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the other hand, if the government is wrongfully attributed with the disappearance 
of people then the estimate could be too high.  For example, in politically 
turbulent nations, random disappearances could be attributed to the government 
even when the government was not involved.  Because political imprisonment, 
and the other physical integrity indicators, contain a global sample of nations, the 
bias has an equal probability of being either high or low, and can be considered 
stochastic noise.   
 The other three variables are more straightforward and are more easily 
defined.  Torture, according to Cingranelli and Richards is the deliberate infliction 
of pain on individuals by the government. Torture can be both mental and 
physical in nature.  Extrajudicial killings are defined as the killing of members of 
the citizenry by government officials without operating under the process of 
law.238  Finally, political imprisonment is the incarceration of individuals for their 
political or religious affiliation and their membership in racial, political and 
religious groups.239   
In order to enhance the robustness of the results, other datasets for human 
rights have been employed. State Department and Amnesty International 
measures of human rights to obtain a more complete perspective of human rights.  
These indicators both cover the time period of 1976-2000, and their values range 
on a scale of 1-5.  A value of 1 indicates systematic and uniform recognition and 
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protection of all physical integrity rights and a value of 5 indicates systematic 
repression of human rights.  This measure suffers from the same problems as the 
additive index created by Richards and Cingranelli because it is impossible to 
determine what specific aspects of human rights are causing the value to change 
in each case, and what factors are being influenced by the sanctions.  When used 
in conjunction with the individual components of the CIRI index, these two 
measures can serve as corroboration of any conclusions that are obtained and a 
substantial boost to this study’s robustness.   
 To quantify economic sanctions it is appropriate to utilize the Threat and 
Imposition of Economic Sanctions dataset.  This dataset includes not only 
sanctions that were imposed upon a target regime but also situations in which 
economic sanctions were threatened upon a target regime. This dataset covers the 
years from 1971-2000, representing a nearly two decade long period which is 
included in the human rights data.  Types of sanctions that can be implemented 
include: economic embargoes, restrictions on imports and exports, freezing target 
assets, cessation of foreign aid to the target, travel ban, and blockades.240   These 
various forms of economic sanctions are coded into an ordinal measure ranging 
from 0 to 2.  A value of 0 indicates no sanction or threat imposed in a given year.  
If less severe forms of sanctions are threatened or implemented the target country 
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receives a value of 1 in a particular year.  Severe sanctions implemented against a 
target warrant a value of 2 according to the ordinal scale of sanction severity.241   
  Variables such as interstate and civil conflict are measured and included 
in the analysis.242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 Nations that are engaged in international 
wars are occupied with the affairs of the battlefield and feel politically susceptible 
to any perceived act of sedition.  Because the government feels vulnerable, it will 
repress the population to prevent any threat.  Likewise, when a nation is 
embroiled in a civil war, every citizen is a potential enemy.  The government will 
repress and violate the physical integrity rights of the population in an attempt to 
eliminate potential enemy soldiers and sympathizers.   The research designs 
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which incorporate measures of these variables that serve as control mechanisms 
have arrived at quite dissimilar results.  War, or the presence of hostilities in a 
nation, either from the actions of a rebel group within the state or an international 
adversary, is hypothesized to have a negative impact upon human rights 
violations.  If any type of war is occurring within a nation during a period of 
observation, it is believed that the human rights of citizens will be less secure and 
more likely to be violated by the regime.  Previous literature on human rights fails 
to deliver any semblance of a consensus on whether civil or interstate war has any 
significant effect upon human rights violations.  Poe and Tate find that both 
international and civil conflict have a significant positive effect upon levels of 
human rights violations within a nation250 while Peksen concludes that civil war 
operates as expected similar to as in Poe and Tate’s study, but international 
conflict is not significant at all.251 Peace years simply measured as the number of 
years since the last military conflict within a nation is expected to be inversely 
related to higher levels of violation.  Finally, the political instability of a nation 
and how close they are to engaging in conflict is expected to be related to higher 
values of repression.   
The replication data used by Peksen includes the complete data from both 
the Cingranelli Richards Human Rights Database and the Threat and Imposition 
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of Economic Sanctions data.  The Peksen dataset also includes revised and 
recoded variables for each of the human rights measurements included in the 
Cingranelli Richards Database.  Peksen recognized the inherent problems of the 
counterintuitive coding scheme of these variables and corrected for the problem.  
The second important contribution of the Peksen data is that he distinguished 
between sanctions that were issued over human rights issues and those which 
were implemented for other reasons.  By using the measure of economic sanctions 
that does not include sanctions issued over human rights issues there is no longer 
a threat of the coefficients and standard errors being biased by endogeneity. 
Sanctions are coded on a scale of 0 through 2.  A value of 0 indicates no sanction 
implemented, a value of 1 indicated limited and less severe sanctions, and a value 
of 2 indicates severe and costly sanctions.  While this coding scheme limits the 
amount of variation within the variable, it does allow analysis through maximum 
likelihood estimation because of the ordinal nature of the coding.  Population and 
GDP per capita data is included in this data set and is logged so that each exhibits 
a more normalized distribution.   
Civil war, international war, peace years, and political instability 
information are obtained from the data collected and used by Clayton L. Thyne in 
his article “Cheap Signals with Costly Consequences: The Effect of Interstate 
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Relations on Civil War, 1945—1999.”252  In this dataset, Thyne uses a dummy 
variable to measure civil war, international war, and political instability. The 
peace years variable is coded to represent the number of years since the last 
military conflict that the nation was engaged in.  According to Thyne, “Instability 
captures possible weakness and disorganization in states that have recently 
become independent or have undergone major transitions.”253 By combining the 
replication data of Peksen and Thyne, it will be possible to draw robust, 
conclusions concerning the relationship between economic sanctions and human 
rights levels within distinct democratic regimes.  
Finally, the data, which distinguishes democracies according to their 
electoral system, is obtained from the replication data of Alvarez, Cheibub, 
Limongi, and Przeworski’s study.254  This data, which covers the time period of 
1950-1990 assigns a value of 1 to parliamentary systems, 2 to mixed democratic 
systems that are semi-presidential, and 3 to presidential democracies. Autocratic, 
or non-democratic states receive a value of 0.   Because this analysis is concerned 
with democracies, and not autocratic nations, it is necessary to drop all autocratic 
nations from the sample leaving only variation in the institutional makeup of 
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democracies.  Further, because autocracies make up such a large share of the 
original dataset, these values will skew and bias thecoefficients no matter how 
they are coded.  Also, this dataset includes a variable which measures how often 
leadership changes within a nation. Using this measurement, it is possible to 
determine the extent to which leadership is susceptible to electoral pressure or 
whether the leadership is insulated from political threat. 
Typically, data pertaining to regime type or institutional composition is 
dichotomized for ease of use and interpretation.  The coding system employed for 
this thesis keeps the measure of presidentialism in its original coding scheme.  
Running the entire series of analysis with both the original measure as designed 
by Alvarez, Cheibub, Limongi, and Przeworski and the dichotomous institutional 
composition measure reveal no differences in either the direction or the levels of 
statistical significance of the coefficients.  Transforming the original three-point 
scale of presidentialism also throws out valuable information inherent in the 
measure.  By using the original measurement system, conclusions can be made 
about movement along a scale of presidentialism rather than just presidential 
democracies or parliamentary governments.   
Data obtained from Alvarez, Cheibub, Limongi, and Przeworski also 
offers a measurement of riots, which is given a value representing the number of 
violent protests with over 100 participants during a year. Nations with more riots 
in a year should be more prone to repress, ceteris paribus, as the government 
seeks to control the violence within the national borders.   Also, they include a 
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measurement for the period of recovery after wars or conflicts.  This variable is 
given a value of 1 for every year within the five-year period after a conflict has 
ceased, and a value of 0 otherwise.  Physical integrity rights are expected to be 
diminished in this period because the leadership is still wary of reverting into 
violence and will respond to any potential problem with violence and repression.  
In summation, the dataset which is being utilized offers a time period of analysis 
from 1976-1990 using the State Department and Amnesty International data and 
1981-1990 using the CIRI index. 
Limitations 
  There are many ways to test the two hypotheses derived from the theory of 
human rights and economic sanctions through statistical and empirical means. 
Due to the fact that the dependent variables, the different measures of human 
rights, are all discrete there are regression assumptions which are violated.  
Because of heteroskedascity and non-linearity within the data, the standard errors 
obtained will be wrong, however, the coefficients will remain unbiased.  
Therefore, because of the noise added to the standard errors it is possible that the 
conclusions will lead to a Type II error where the null hypothesis is retained when 
it would actually be possible to reject the null hypothesis in favor of the 
alternative hypothesis. Worse, it is possible that if the correlation between the 
independent variable and the error term, “are positively correlated, the bias in sb is 
negative, and thus sb will tend to underestimate the standard deviation of the OLS 
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estimator, b.”255  The result of such a bias in the standard errors would lead to a 
Type I error in which the null hypothesis is erroneously rejected in favor of an 
alternative hypothesis when there is insufficient evidence to do so given the data 
that was used.  While OLS models could be used in this research, it is more fitting 
for a weighted least squares model, generalized least squares model, or maximum 
likelihood estimation to be used instead. While it is not an optimal solution, it is 
possible to cross check the regression analysis using the robust qualifier in 
STATA 11.0 SE and if the robust standard errors did not change the p-values for 
any of the coefficients in the full models it might be tempting to accept the 
standard errors as unbiased.  The usage of the robust qualifier is, at best, a 
treatment and not a cure for the violations of the classic regression model.    
 Results obtained from a simple OLS analysis alone will not be adequate to 
test the two hypotheses primarily because the variables of interest are measured at 
the ordinal or nominal level instead of continuous at the interval level.256  Because 
of the numerous violations of OLS regression assumptions a more sophisticated 
and nuanced approach to the data is warranted.  This analysis utilizes ordinal data 
to measure both economic sanctions and human rights and most of the control 
variables are either nominal or ordinal.  Due to the limited nature of the both the 
explanatory and response variables in this analysis, a series of ordered probit 
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models appears to be the most appropriate means to test the hypotheses.  Ordered 
probit models are specifically designed to account for ordinal dependent variables 
such as the different measures of physical integrity rights used.  This analysis will 
consist of probit models for both parliamentary and presidential democratic states.  
By conducting the analysis through the lens of maximum likelihood estimation 
the conclusions obtained will be more efficient and robust than if OLS regression 
was utilized.   
As mentioned briefly in the introduction of this project, the issue of the 
potential for an endogoneity bias must be assessed.  Technically speaking, 
endogeneity occurs when the explanatory variable is correlated with the error 
term.257 The fundamental problem with an endogenous bias is that a feedback 
loop is created where it is impossible to understand how the independent variable 
is influencing the dependent variable, or even if there is a reverse causality, in 
which the dependent variable is influencing the independent variable.258  Because 
the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions dataset is so thorough and 
includes the actual motivation for the sanction in the dataset, there is a way in 
which I can correct for endogeneity by using this dataset.  It is possible to exclude 
all cases in which the motivation for the sanctions had anything to do with human 
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rights. Through the elimination of these cases that could feed an endogenous loop 
I am essentially removing any feedback which is occurring.  Because the 
motivation for the sanction is known and only cases of sanctions that were 
implemented for reasons other than violations or repression of human rights, the 
potential for feedback and endogenous bias is significantly reduced.  Another 
solution to the potential bias resulting from endogeneity would be the formulation 
of a set of instrumental variables that are correlated only with economic sanctions 
and can be measured against components of human rights.  If these instruments 
are not sufficient or theoretically strong, the bias will not only remain but will 
actually be exacerbated.  Thus, a more practical and pragmatic solution is the 
exclusion of sanctions which were issued in response to human rights dilemmas.  
This solution frees the analysis theoretically from the quandary of endogeneity, 
and alleviates the problems that could result from poor instrumentation.   
It is also argued by many methodologists that it is possible to lag the explanatory 
variable to correct for an endogenous bias.  According to this logic, there is a 
temporal gap that is created by lagging the explanatory variable, the correlation 
between the two variables is eliminated due to a previous years observation being 
directly related to the current observation year. Yet, lagging of the explanatory 
variables was not implemented into this research design because, “lagged 
explanatory variables is almost never justified on identification grounds, and so it 
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does not buy causal identification on the cheap.”259 Therefore, due to the 
limitations inherent in the approach of lagging explanatory variables as a panacea 
for an endogenous bias, it is more methodologically and theoretically sound to opt 
for the utilization of appropriate date to serve as indicators of the concepts of 
interest.   
Findings: Are All Democracies Equal? 
 To test the hypotheses outline, 18 different ordered probit models were 
utilized that incorporated seven different measurements of physical integrity 
rights.  Because it was hypothesized that physical integrity rights levels are 
contingent upon the institutional composition of a democratic nation (i.e. whether 
the democracy is a presidential or a parliamentary system) and the simultaneous 
severity of an imposed sanction, it was necessary to create a variable which 
measured the interaction between institution and sanction severity.  This 
interaction term acts as the main explanatory variable through this analysis.  
Examination of the entirety of the results presents interesting conclusions 
dependent upon the measurement that was utilized in the particular test.   Using 
different measures of human rights produce drastically different conclusions 
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about the implications of physical integrity rights within different types of 
democratic regimes that have been the target of economic sanctions.   
Finding One 
 The first finding pertains to the level of torture that is exhibited between 
different forms of democracy.  Ordered probit results for the models using the 
three-point ordinal scale of torture are found in Table 1.  In both of the descriptive 
models, the variables of interest move in a positive direction and are statistically 
significant.  Within the first descriptive model (Model 1A) which measures the 
interaction of presidentialism and sanction severity, the coefficient is positive and 
significant at the 0.002 level indicating that a relationship this strong would have 
only been obtained .2% of the time, purely by chance, given this data.  The 
second descriptive model of torture provides similarly expected results.  Both 
presidentialism and the severity of sanctions are strongly statistically significant 
and move in a positive direction as hypothesized.  Therefore, the first descriptive 
model (Model 1A) suggests that as democracies become more presidential in their 
institutional design, and more severe sanctions are imposed that torture will 
increase.  Likewise, the positive and significant coefficients for both 
presidentialism and sanction severity (Model 1B) indicate that nations which are 
more presidential in their makeup and democracies which have more severe 
sanctions are associated with higher levels of human rights repression.   It is not 
possible to establish causality from a bivariate or descriptive model.  Examination 
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of the complete model which contains the full set of variables is necessary for 
more robust conclusions to be drawn that are in concordance with the theory 
which has been established and outlined.   
 The results for the complete model of torture present some interesting 
findings.  Looking at the coefficients in Table 1 for Model 1C, it can be seen that 
the measure of presidentialism is still positive and significant.  The interaction 
term between presidentialism and the severity of the sanctions is no longer 
significant at any accepted level.  More interesting, the coefficient for sanction 
severity is now negative and is no longer statistically significant.  This explains 
why the interaction term between presidentialism and sanction severity is no 
longer significant. Because this variable measures the interaction between 
presidentialism and the severity of sanctions, the contrasting direction of the 
coefficients erodes the likelihood of obtaining statistical significance.  What the 
full model of torture shows is that more presidential democratic regimes are 
correlated with higher levels of torture.  Presidential regimes have a higher 
probability of torturing citizens than do parliamentary democracies.  This 
relationship does not appear to operate through the imposition or severity of 
economic sanctions.  Sanction severity actually has an inverse relationship with 
torture, as exhibited by the negative coefficient. Therefore, as sanction severity 
increases, democratic nations are less inclined to torture their populations.  Civil 
war, sanction duration, and population are all positive and significantly related to 
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torture, as expected.  GDP per capita, has a negative coefficient and is significant, 
indicating that as wealth in a nation increases, democratic nations are less apt to 
resort to torture as a policy.   
Finding Two 
 Continuing, the second finding pertains to the levels of political killings 
and the distinctions according to presidentialism.  The results from the series of 
models examining the relationship of the explanatory variables with political 
killing present a similar picture as the first series of ordered probit regressions 
focused on torture.  In model 2A and 2B, presented on Table 2, the descriptive 
models behave as expected and in a similar manner to the earlier models using 
torture.  In Model 2A, the interaction between sanction severity and the 
presidentialism of a democracy is statistically significant and has a positive 
coefficient as predicted.  In Model 2B, both of the variables of interest possess 
positive and strongly statistically significant coefficients.  With the full ordered 
probit model, the significance for the interaction term disappears, and the 
coefficient’s direction changes and is now negative.  Of the main explanatory 
variables, only presidentialism remains significant. Just as with the full model of 
torture, democratic systems that are more presidential in their framework are 
strongly related to more systematic and widespread instances of political killings.  
Although, just as with the analysis on torture, the severity of the economic 
sanction that is imposed does not seem to factor into whether more presidential 
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nations engage in political killings.  Still, the more presidential a system, the more 
likely it is that the nations will engage in political killings. 
Findings Three and Four 
 The third and fourth findings are concerned with arguably less severe 
forms of human rights violations, especially when compared to torture and 
killings.  These are the findings related to political imprisonment and 
disappearances, respectively.  The final two series of ordered probits conducted 
using components of the CIRI index, are arguably less severe forms of human 
rights abuses.  Political imprisonment and disappearances, while unsavory, are not 
perceived with the same degree of international outrage with which killings and 
torture are viewed.  While killings and torture are events which make the evening 
news and draw public outrage, both domestically and internationally, 
disappearances and imprisonment tend to go under the public radar.  Therefore, it 
would seem that democracies, in an attempt to protect their international image 
would be more inclined to implement these types of repressive tactics.  This 
assumption does not hold upon examination of the series of ordered probit 
regressions using political imprisonment and disappearances.  In both Tables 3 
and 4, the coefficients in the descriptive models all behave as expected and are 
strongly significant. Both presidentialism and sanction severity are significant and 
positive, indicating a that more presidential democracies and more severe 
sanctions are associated with higher levels of disappearances and political 
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imprisonment. Further, when political disappearances and imprisonment are 
regressed on the interaction between sanction severity and presidentialism’s 
coefficient is positive and significant as expected.  The bivariate ordered probit 
regression in Models 3A and 4A initially suggest that as nations that are more 
presidential are subjected to more severe sanctions, that both political 
imprisonment and disappearances will increase. Once again, upon running an 
ordered probit regression for the complete models, the results become less clear. 
Most notable is the model for political imprisonment displayed in Table 4.  None 
of the key variables are significant, and the coefficient for the measure of sanction 
severity is negative indicating that as more stringent and intense sanctions are 
imposed on a democracy, the incidents of imprisonment for political motives 
becomes less prevalent. Similarly, the coefficient for sanction severity is also 
negative and insignificant in Model 3C in Table 3.  Because of the weakness of 
these coefficients with respect to their standard errors it is impossible to say with 
any certainty that these relationships are not being reported in these equations by 
mere chance.   
Finding Five 
 The fifth finding is an aggregate model of human rights violations that 
uses the Amnesty International data rather than the CIRI index of human rights 
violations.  Instead of merely determining whether to retain the null hypothesis or 
reject it, based solely on the ordered probit tests using the CIRI indicators, this 
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analysis also tested the set of variables using human rights data from other 
sources of data. Although the Amnesty International data is an index, so it is not 
possible to see what form of violations are causing movement along the scale, 
when used in conjunction with other data robustness is heightened. Table 5 
contains the results from the series of ordered probit models using human rights 
data from Amnesty International as the dependent variable.  Just as with the 
models in Tables 1-4, the descriptive models show a positive and strong 
statistically significant relationship.  Most notably, however, is that when the full 
model with all control variables included is utilized, the significance of the 
coefficient for sanction severity and presidentialism’s interaction not only 
evaporates and becomes insignificant, the sign also changes. Model 5C in Table 5 
shows that the interaction term of sanction severity and presidentialism has a 
coefficient of -.069.   A negative sign for this coefficient suggests a relationship 
that is in complete contrast to the hypotheses set forth in this paper.  Instead of 
human rights being harmed as a result of democracies which are more presidential 
experiencing sanctions, a negative coefficient for this variable indicates that 
human rights are adversely affected by parliamentary systems that are sanctioned.  
Although the direction of the coefficient is interesting, the high standard error, 
and therefore, the low Z-score means that it is not certain whether this result was 
obtained by accident given the data utilized.  Outside of the interaction term, 
presidentialism remains statistically significant and shows a positive coefficient.   
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Finding Six 
 The sixth, and final finding, is similar to the finding of the Amnesty 
International data, however, for this model and finding, State Department data 
was utilized.  Of all of the measures and models utilized in this analysis, only the 
State Department indicator of human rights integrity produces results that 
completely support hypotheses 1 and 2.  In Model 6C presented in Table 6, the 
coefficient of the interaction term between sanction severity and presidentialism is 
positive and statistically significant with a P-value greater than .001.  A P-value 
this strong indicates that I would have arrived at these results less than one time in 
a thousand by complete chance if there was no relationship between the 
interaction and the State Department measurement of human rights.  Therefore, 
the State Department data supports the argument that the imposition of more 
severe types of economic sanctions against democracies with more presidentialist 
political structures.   Interestingly, while the coefficient for presidentialism is 
significant and positive, the coefficient for the severity of the imposed sanction is 
negative and statistically significant. 
For example, Figure 2 shows that the average presidential system is over 
38% less likely to see low or limited levels of political killing than the average 
presidential democracy.  Similarly, moderate levels of political killings are 31% 
more likely in presidential systems than parliamentary ones, and the probability of 
pervasive and systematic killings jumps just over 7% when moving to a 
143 
 
presidential democracy.  This substantive and statistical trend holds across all 
models except for political imprisonment. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
UNWRAPPING THE ANALYSIS: THE INTERPRETATION OF FINDINGS 
Assessing the Expected and the Unexpected 
 Three distinct conclusions are gleaned from this research. A first 
conclusion, in relation to the first research question and the subsequent first 
hypothesis, that economic sanctioning would exacerbate the human rights 
atrocities in presidential democracies is not wholly supported by this analysis. 
Second, the second research question and hypothesis, is that presidential 
democracies are more apt to repress their populations. Third, there is some 
inconsistency within the data, as different datasets offer different results and can 
potentially lead to different conclusions if considered in isolation.  In other words, 
there are substantive differences in human rights levels between democratic 
states, but it cannot be said with any authority that economic sanctions have any 
impact on these levels in any direction.   
Commencing with the first research question and hypothesis, looking at 
the results paints an interesting perspective of just how democratic states operate 
and how different types of democracies can vary tremendously on issues that are 
perceived to be core attributes of the democratic conceptualization. Interestingly, 
the results indicate an unexpected trend in some respect. Sanctioning as a catalyst 
for repression in democratic states is insignificant.  What is interesting, and 
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expected, is that there is a marked difference of statistical significance in the 
respect levels for basic human rights and freedoms between different forms of 
democratic government within a nation.  Ultimately, the type of democracy that is 
instituted as a governing system can have tremendous implications for the people 
who are represented via a democratic system.   
An examination of the results of all full models shows some interesting 
trends.  In all but the full model using State Department data, the interaction 
between sanction severity and presidentialism was statistically insignificant. 
Further, coefficients for sanction severity were negative in all models, except for 
killing where the coefficient was statistically insignificant.  Finding negative 
coefficients for this variable across most of the models leads to the conclusion 
that when more severe sanctions are imposed against any type of democratic 
regime, human rights typically improve. Therefore, all types of democracies are 
not equal in regard to their respect for human rights.   In all of the full models 
except for political imprisonment, presidentialism is positively associated with 
increased levels of violating a particular human rights indicator.  Human rights 
are typically worse in presidential regimes.  Although, the theory that I offered is 
not entirely exhibited in the results provided by the data, it is the case that the data 
does support my theoretical assumption that presidential systems are more likely 
to violate their populations than democratic systems governed by parliament.  
Because sanction severity is actually inversely related to human rights abuses in 
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democratic nations, appears that implementing sanctions might actually help 
human rights in presidential systems rather than cause harm.   
The different measures of physical integrity rights which make up the 
CIRI index did not support the first hypothesis that presidential systems will 
violate physical integrity rights more than parliamentary democracies. The 
interaction term between sanction severity and presidentialism was not significant 
in any of the models and the coefficient of sanction severity shifted from a 
positive to a negative orientation contingent upon the measure of physical 
integrity rights used.  Only presidentialism remained fairly consistent across most 
of the models, moving as expected and exhibiting a statistically significant 
coefficient in three of the four full models.   
There remains the question of what precisely is different within the State 
Department data that is causing results which are not in line with the CIRI index 
or the Amnesty dataset.  Recall, that it was only with the State Department data 
that results which were in agreement with both hypotheses were achieved.  While 
it is only speculation, one of the main reasons for the difference could be due to 
the fact that the State Department is a governmental agency and the CIRI and 
Amnesty data sets were compiled by individuals and through a non-governmental 
organization.  With any index, it is difficult to know what is causing movement 
along the scale.  It is possible that there is a different threshold for violations by 
those conducting the measurements at the State Department. The deeper question 
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that would require more insight into State Department intelligence techniques is 
whether it is more accurate than data collected by nongovernmental organizations.  
Because the resources of the federal government is behind the State Department, 
it is entirely possible that it is the case that their data is the most representative of 
reality.  That is beyond the scope of this examination.  
 The second research question and hypothesis’ analysis reveal conclusions 
more in accord with the theory described above. Results obtained by running the 
ordered probit models through Clarify reveal the substantive change in probability 
from moving from a parliamentary system to a presidential democracy.  In 
running the model, all other variables were set  to their mean, in order to see the 
difference in human rights recognition between average presidential and average 
parliamentary democratic systems.  Table 7 shows the results from using Clarify 
on all of the full ordered probit models.  Moving from a parliamentary democracy 
to a presidential system, decreases the probability of encountering the lowest level 
of repression for any of the indicators.  
 Results for tests using CIRI’s political imprisonment variable are 
enigmatic.  It would seem natural that imprisonment would be less severe than 
torture and killings, and that nations that are engaging in seemingly more severe 
types of repression would have high levels of imprisonment by default.  The data 
does not support this conclusion.  While arguably more severe forms or repression 
are strongly associated with systems that are presidential, imprisonment remains 
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insignificant.  One theoretical answer for this perplexing result lies in the 
visibility of political prisoners.  These people are often able to get their message 
out to domestic and international groups.  Democracies, which care about their 
reputation among other actors, might opt for severe forms of repression, which 
inhibit the flow of information to other groups in the international arena.260  
Instead of merely imprisoning individuals governments determine to silence them 
by killing or simply causing them to disappear instead.   
 Political imprisonment might display unexpected and statistically 
insignificant coefficients because democracies find non-political reasons to 
incarcerate political targets. According to the coding scheme devised by 
Cingranelli and Richards, political imprisonment is the incarceration of 
individuals for their political or religious affiliation and their membership in 
racial, political and religious groups.261  Instead of arresting individuals for their 
opposition of the ruling government, people are charged with other offenses in an 
attempt to euphemize the political nature of the incarceration.  An individual 
leading a protest rally might be detained and charged with disorderly conduct.  
Instability in the indicator could be a consequence of a lack of available 
information.  It is possible that presidential regimes are more likely to violate 
physical integrity rights through political imprisonment, but these governments 
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have found a way to obscure the true level of political prisoners within their 
borders. 
 Ultimately, the results indicate support for the second hypothesis, 
however, not the first hypothesis posited. While economic sanctioning is 
statistically moot as a motivation for a democracy to repress, a statistically 
significant and strong trend exists between the presidential composition of a 
democracy and their propensity to repress.  As was the expectation of this 
analysis, presidential democracies do repress more than their parliamentary 
siblings.  Not all democracies are alike with respect for their recognition of basic 
human dignity rights.  It should be expected that the United States and other 
Western, democratic, states will continue to push for international foreign policy 
that focuses on fostering democratic transition around the world.  This research 
has added to the literature that urging democratic transition alone is not sound 
policy.  Policy should be focused instead and seek to maximize both the potential 
for long-term success of democracy and simultaneously the goal of human rights.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
FOR THE FUTURE: POLICY AND RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS 
Power of the People? 
 The quantitative analysis conducted in the previous chapter provides a 
clear distinction amongst democratic regimes.  Not all democracies are equal in 
their respect for the physical integrity rights of their populations.  Violations of 
physical integrity protections are the most fundamental and universally accepted 
variations of human rights.  The truth of physical respect can be traced back 
across millennia.  The Golden Rule, derived from the Biblical teaching of Jesus, 
where followers are instructed to, “Do unto others as you would have them do 
unto you,” highlights the principle at the most basic functional level.262 Other 
religions have similar sentiments within their respective scriptural literature. The 
notion of the respect of the person has been integral to the relationship of the state 
to the person from the onset of civilization dating back to Hammurabi and the 
code that he established.  More so, the state has been viewed as an instrument of 
protection, rather than harm, of the individual and their personal rights such as 
their physical bodies, personal beliefs and even their property.263  Likewise, 
democracies typically operate through their protection of individual rights. Recall 
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that democracies operate through consent of the governed and the government is 
constructed as an instrument of representation of the citizenry.   
 Analysis conducted in this paper argued against much of the generally 
accepted knowledge of democracies.  Democracies are typically perceived as 
virtuous counterparts to the inherent evil of autocracies.  Autocracies, after all, 
inflict physical harm on their populations and repress them through fear and 
intimidation.  First, and most fundamental, the findings of this thesis have shown 
that not all democratic forms of government are equal in their respect for human 
rights. In relation to the first research question and the first hypothesis, 
presidential systems’ linkage to military authoritarianism makes them more 
susceptible to repressive governmental tactics against citizens. In this work, it has 
been attempted to theoretically explain this relationship positing that the 
imposition of economic sanctions act as a catalyst for violence against 
populations in presidential democracies.  This relationship was not significant. 
  Parliamentary democracies, as outlined in the second research question 
and the second hypothesis, were less likely than presidential democracies to 
repress their populations.  This held across multiple indicators of human rights 
levels.  Differences between parliamentary and presidential systems were 
significant. Presidential systems have a lower probability of having little or no 
incidents of repression and a higher probability of experiencing all other levels of 
repressions across every indicator except political imprisonment.  Finally, in 
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many models the severity of a sanction had an inverse relationship with 
repression, indicating that a side effect of more severe sanctions could possibly be 
higher levels of human rights recognition in democratic nations.  This is uncertain 
as most coefficients were statistically insignificant.   
The first primary policy implication to arise from this thesis pertains to the 
democratization mission of the United States’ and other nations’ foreign policy 
trajectories. This research brings a new angle to the discussion of how nations 
should democratize.  As the United States and other Western powers attempt to 
spread democracy, the leaders of these nations should be mindful that the 
electoral system which a nation adopts can have severe ramifications for the 
citizens in these nations.  Spreading democracy is not enough.  Care must be 
taken to ensure that the democratic framework of nations ensures the protection of 
fundamental human freedoms and the physical integrity of all people.   Sadly, 
presidential systems do not offer this assurance better than parliamentary systems.   
The United States, especially, has been inconsistent at best with how it crafts 
foreign policy over human rights.  Julie A. Mertus has instead, advocated a 
“human rights culture” be cultivated in the United States at all levels of society. In 
a state where the overwhelming majority of individuals, over 90 percent, have no 
understanding of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it is little surprise 
that the policy of the United States over human rights is inconsistent, or even 
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dangerous in some respects.264   Policy flows from the population, and those who 
seek votes to remain in power will notice the sentiments of the electorate.  
Second, the domestic implications upon civil society and the private 
population are also manifest from this research. The answer according to Mertus, 
and many who share her perspective, is that policy can be more appropriately 
influenced and shaped through the work of citizens and communities.  According 
to Mertus, “Wholly apart from activities related to international treaties and 
domestic legislation, civil society organizations have found creative ways to 
shape policy options.”265  Via activists, private organizations and increased 
education and awareness, pressure can be put not only onto nations which are 
deficient in their respect for human rights in its various capacities, but also on 
states which interact with offending states.  Trade, military engagement, and other 
variations of cooperation can be shaped through domestic pressure on leaders and 
have international consequences and ramifications.  Therefore, within the United 
States, it is possible, through the vehicle of civil society, that “smart 
democratization” can be emphasized as a policy preference amongst voters and 
that human rights will improve as a consequence of states moving toward fuller, 
and more representative variants of democracy rather than presidential systems 
which often maintain facets of authoritarian governance.   
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Third, and finally, the role of the United States in the world order must be 
assessed domestically and internationally.  This is a pivotal implication that 
springs out of these findings. The United States is perceived to be a world leader 
in the proliferation of democratic ideals and the fundamental principles of human 
rights.  Much of the private American psyche is encapsulated within the context 
of America operating as a bastion for liberty, freedom and security.266   America 
is understood to be exceptional, doing what no other nation can, or will do.  
America is held to a higher moral standard than the other nations of the world.  
When other nations falter, no one notices or cares, when America slips, or appears 
to be slipping in some manner, the world waits anxiously to see what the outcome 
will be.267  Further, America, according to Huntington is important due to the fact 
that America is a beacon of democratic values which other nations desire to 
possess, and which only America is fit or able to transfer to other nations.  He 
attempts to corroborate this claim by citing the historical record of American 
involvement and intervention in the developing world throughout the twentieth 
century.  When America intervened in the affairs of Latin America and the 
Caribbean democracy showed signs of proliferation and solidification.  When 
American power and dominance over the international system began to wane in 
the 1970s, the prospect for democratic governance and ideals in these nations was 
curtailed and the United States was only able to attempt to influence these new 
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leaders to treat their populations with dignity and to honor their basic fundamental 
freedoms.268   
Moving the Ball Forward: Suggestions for Future Research 
 While this inquiry has attempted to examine the concept of democracy via 
the nuances and variations that compose this political system rather than as the 
sum of its parts, there is still considerable work that can and should be conducted 
to further elucidate the complexity of democratic systems. Future research into 
this area can expand on this work and further add to the understanding of each of 
the concepts that have been explored throughout this project.   
 First, research in the future can approach this question, or a similar 
question, from a different methodological perspective. Methodologically, it 
utilized a quantitative approach to addressing the three research questions It 
commenced with and to assess my hypotheses which followed.  It was, therefore, 
able to consider all democracies under sanctions policy for nearly thirty years 
ranging from the Cold War through to the post-September 11th, 2001 period.  
Because of the large timeframe and the scope of this study it seems that the 
generalizability is strong.  In looking at the aggregate range of democracy, it is 
possible to further predict how the form and structure of a nation’s democratic 
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institutions will impact the domestic human rights levels once an exogenous 
economic catalyst is introduced.   
 Second, future research can expand the theoretical scope of this research 
into their own project. As has been made clear, it was determined to utilize the 
imposition or the threat of an economic sanction as a major factor of whether a 
democracy will repress the human rights of its citizenry and also when that 
repression will manifest.  Obviously, because economic sanctions are part of the 
interaction term that comprise the independent variable, the repression must occur 
afterward, or at the very least, increase after the imposition of the sanction.  
Further research into this area can also be expanded theoretically and push into 
areas beyond the imposition or threat of an economic sanctions. The possibilities 
for expansion through further nuanced inquiry are limitless.  
 Most striking, and disappointing, within the models that were employed in 
this research, economic sanctions did not arise as being of any statistical 
significance. Therefore, sanctioning is not a precedent for repression as was 
initially hypothesized.  Through more theoretical work, it would be a valid 
endeavor to attempt to parse out more of the nuances of how and why 
democracies differ with their respect for fundamental freedoms.  That is, what are 
some preconditions that might explain what would lead presidential states to feel 
the theorized externally imposed shock on their domestic security and to respond 
with repressions.  From a theoretical perspective it is possible to consider a 
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multitude of possible potentially theoretically significant concepts that can be 
utilized instead of economic sanctions.  Future research can utilize similar models 
to the ones employed in this project in an attempt to analyze the concepts that are 
deemed of interest.   
 Third, there are extending projects that are able to be derived utilizing a 
similar format, theoretical approach and methodology. Two research projects 
seem immediately pertinent.  First, because this study only looked at the threat 
posed through an economic lens, it would be enlightening to conduct a similar 
study where the threat is measured along an ordinal scale and interacted with the 
ordinal scale of “presidentialism” which has been employed in this research.  By 
looking at the severity of the external threat posed and interact the measurement 
with the type of democracy instituted, further information into the realities of 
democracy and democratic governance can be achieved.  Democracy is seen as a 
bastion of physical, civil and other human rights.  If these are voided in the face of 
a mounting threat, then the promise of democracy might not be as sterling as it is 
perceived to be and it would be best for leaders and policy advisors to push for 
smart democracies which can address these fundamental shortcomings.  Further, 
previous research has shown that democracies take time to form and coalesce into 
what they are ultimately going to become one day.  Just like a child takes time to 
form into an adult, no matter the potential that is present within the child, it takes 
time for the child to develop and actualize into their potential.  Further research 
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should also examine the lifespan of democracy.  Examining this variable and 
incorporating it into a future project can add a new layer by considering the time 
that it takes for a nation’s democratic endeavors to congeal into a functioning 
democracy which might be more likely to protect human rights regardless of the 
level of threat faced.   
 On a similar, yet unrelated note, it is possible for this research to be 
flipped on its head and to be analyzed from the perspective of autocracies rather 
than democracies.  Just as there is variation and differences between democratic 
institutions, so to do autocracies vary.  In fact, the variations are far more plentiful 
and nuanced in their composition.  Yet there is a tendency among both policy 
makers and historians as well to homogenize types of autocracies.269 Looking at 
autocracies in a similar manner will help examination of past, present and future 
policies with respect to these types of nations.  Ultimately, autocracies are a major 
global reality.  Many nations, even ones that have democratic tendencies, or were 
once democratic themselves, have autocratic governments.  With globalization 
and development occurring across the world, many autocratic nations are 
becoming global economic and military powers that cannot be ignored and must, 
therefore, be understood more completely and thoroughly.  In fact, there is the 
potential to expand this research out into a complete global analysis where 
                                                          
269. Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin 
(New York: Basic Books, 2010).  
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governmental system is viewed along a spectrum in which movement from 
autocracy to democracy can be assessed once a logical structure for an ordinal 
scale of governance can be constructed and systemized.   
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CHAPTER NINE 
CONCLUSION 
 In this research, it has been attempted to show how physical integrity 
rights are differently impacted across varying democratic systems.  In using 
economic sanctions as a representation of an exogenous threat or shock to the 
domestic system, a likely scenario in which these rights would likely be restricted 
or violated has also been displayed.  Arguably, it logically follows that the 
propensity for violation would increase as the threat similarly increases.  What 
has been shown is that the type of democracy that a nation maintains does matter.  
Overall, presidential systems are more likely to repress in the event of a crisis 
than are parliamentary democracies.  Moving forward, it is likely that the United 
States and other Western and democratic powers will push for political 
reformation in autocratic nations or those with limited democratic features.  
Leaders must be smart and institute policies that will create situations that are 
conducive for the betterment of human life and opportunity. The responsibility is 
not only a moral imperative, where we are expected to help others if we can, but 
also the responsibility is inherent in the concepts of democracy where all are 
created equally.  That is an imperative that applies across the globe, and leaders 
must be cognizant of how their policies impact lives, even in other nations for 
generations after their time in office.   
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APPENDIX 
FIGURE AND TABLES 
 
 
 
Figure 1- Summary Statistics of Main Variables           
           
    Observations Mean   Std. Deviation Variance 
Torture   437  0.764  0.8  0.635 
            
Political Killings 438  0.479  0.721  0.52 
            
Disappearances 438  0.281  0.606  0.367 
            
Pol. Imprisonment 437  0.588  0.79  0.624 
            
Amnesty International 592  2.076  1.183  1.4 
            
State Department 592  1.745  1.035  1.07 
            
Presidentialism 682  1.71  0.916  0.838 
            
Non-Human Rights 
Sanctions 649   0.069   0.294   0.086 
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Table 1- Torture              
         
Ordered  Model 1A   Model 1B   Model 1C   
Probit Descriptive Model 1 Descriptive Model 2 Full Model 
         
Presidentialism   0.438 *** 0.196 *** 
    (0.059)  (.075)   
Sanction Severity   0.581 *** -0.68   
    (0.195)  (.846)   
Civil War     0.845 *** 
      (.223)   
International War     0.152   
      (.429)   
Sanction Duration     0.056 ** 
      (.027)   
Instability     -0.03   
      (.191)   
Peace Years     0.006   
      (.006)   
Riots     0.027   
      (.031)   
GDP per capita     -0.488 *** 
      (.063)   
Population     0.214 *** 
      (.049)   
Recovery Period     0.426   
      (.414)   
Presidentialism * Sanctions  0.222 ***   0.171   
  (0.072)       (0.292)   
cutpoint 1 -0.07  0.713  -0.172   
cutpoint 2 0.789   1.655   1.188   
         
Observations 437  437  434   
Pseudo-R2 0.0111  0.074  0.2805   
Log-likelihood -456.514  -427.448  -329.672   
 NOTE:Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  *** p < .01  ** p < .05  * p < .1   
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Table 2- Political Killings             
       
         
Ordered  Model 2A   Model 2B   Model 2C   
Probit Descriptive Model 1 Descriptive Model 2 Full Model 
         
Presidentialism   0.602 *** 0.555 *** 
    (.065)  (.089)   
Sanction Severity   0.741 *** 0.191   
    (.195)  (.81)   
Civil War     1.641 *** 
      (.257)   
International War     -0.42   
      (.425)   
Sanction Duration     0.035   
      (.027)   
Instability     -0.226   
      (.199)   
Peace Years     0.000989   
      (.00699)   
Riots     -0.036   
      (.026)   
GDP per capita     -0.485 *** 
      (.068)   
Population     0.182 *** 
      (.058)   
Recovery Period     -0.038   
      (.42)   
Presidentialism * Sanctions  0.291 ***   -0.118   
  (.072)       (.281)   
cutpoint 1 0.44  1.587  0.748   
cutpoint 2 1.17   2.454   2.29   
         
Observations 438  438  435   
Pseudo-R2 0.0232  0.1399  0.4439   
Log-likelihood -374.278  -329.546  -210.87   
 NOTE:Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  *** p < .01  ** p < .05  * p < .1 
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Table 3- Political Disappearances           
         
Ordered  Model 3A   Model 3B   Model 3C   
Probit Descriptive Model 1 Descriptive Model 2 Full Model 
         
Presidentialism   0.68 *** 0.833 *** 
    (0.079)  (0.117)   
Sanction Severity   0.424 ** -1.184   
    (0.188)  (1.088)   
Civil War     0.856 *** 
      (0.278)   
International War     1.119 *** 
      (0.434)   
Sanction Duration     0.057 * 
      (0.03)   
Instability     -0.312   
      (0.219)   
Peace Years     -0.03 *** 
      (0.009)   
Riots     -0.013   
      (0.029)   
GDP per capita     -0.192 ** 
      (0.076)   
Population     -0.133 * 
      (0.073)   
Recovery Period     0.122   
      (0.454)   
Presidentialism * Sanctions  0.226 ***   0.225   
  (0.066)       (0.359)   
cutpoint 1 0.892  2.276  -1.419   
cutpoint 2 1.45   2.965   -0.362   
         
Observations 438  438  435   
Pseudo-R2 0.0211  0.1649  0.3989   
Log-likelihood -271.502  -231.611  -164.937   
 NOTE:Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  *** p < .01  ** p < .05  * p < .1 
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Table 4- Political Imprisonment           
         
Ordered  Model 4A   Model 4B   Model 4C   
Probit Descriptive Model 1 Descriptive Model 2 Full Model 
         
Presidentialism   0.319 *** 0.068   
    (0.062)  (0.082)   
Sanction Severity   1.8 *** -0.087   
    (0.361)  (1.346)   
Civil War     1.21 *** 
      (0.242)   
International War     0.023   
      (0.449)   
Sanction Duration     0.021   
      (0.028)   
Instability     0.463 ** 
      (0.206)   
Peace Years     -0.006   
      (0.006)   
Riots     0.029   
      (0.03)   
GDP per capita     -0.306 *** 
      (0.066)   
Population     0.171 *** 
      (0.055)   
Recovery Period     0.44   
      (0.438)   
Presidentialism * Sanctions  1.123 ***   0.788   
  (0.3)       (0.942)   
cutpoint 1 0.32  0.915  0.815   
cutpoint 2 0.988   1.615   1.924   
         
Observations 437  437  434   
Pseudo-R2 0.0527  0.0864  0.3509   
Log-likelihood -392.39  -378.424  -265.721   
 NOTE:Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  *** p < .01  ** p < .05  * p < .1 
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Table 5- Amnesty             
         
Ordered  Model 5A   Model 5B   Model 5C   
Probit Descriptive Model 1 Descriptive Model 2 Full Model 
         
Presidentialism   0.594 *** 0.48 *** 
    (.05)  (.06)   
Sanction Severity   0.673 *** -0.208   
    (.145)  (.471)   
Civil War     1.215 *** 
      (.191)   
International War     -0.44   
      (.342)   
Sanction Duration     0.044 ** 
      (.02)   
Instability     0.086   
      (.143)   
Peace Years     -0.006   
      (.005)   
Riots     -0.035 * 
      (.02)   
GDP per capita     -0.435 *** 
      (.049)   
Population     0.213 *** 
      (.039)   
Recovery Period     0.374   
      (.295)   
Presidentialism * Sanctions  0.228 ***   -0.069   
  (.06)       (.178)   
cutpoint 1 -0.16  0.872  0.222   
cutpoint 2 0.533  1.684  1.422   
cutpoint 3 1.073  2.314  2.522   
cutpoint 4 1.779   3.135   3.782   
         
Observations 592  592  589   
Pseudo-R2 0.0087  0.0972  0.3085   
Log-likelihood -810.862  -738.468  -560.945   
 NOTE:Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  *** p < .01  ** p < .05  * p < .1   
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Table 6- State Department             
         
Ordered  Model 6A   Model 6B   Model 6C   
Probit Descriptive Model 1 Descriptive Model 2 Full Model 
         
Presidentialism   0.586 *** 0.32 *** 
    (.053)  (.066)   
Sanction Severity   0.896 *** -1.799 *** 
    (.152)  (.521)   
Civil War     1.316 *** 
      (.202)   
International War     0.336   
      (0.352)   
Sanction Duration     0.072 *** 
      (.021)   
Instability     0.075   
      ( .149)   
Peace Years     0.000441   
      (.00556)   
Riots     -0.07 *** 
      (.022)   
GDP per capita     -0.662 *** 
      (.0563)   
Population     0.217 *** 
      (.0434)   
Recovery Period     0.274   
      (.3)   
Presidentialism * Sanctions  0.365 ***   0.7 *** 
  (0.064)       (.196)   
cutpoint 1 0.225  1.31  -1.178   
cutpoint 2 0.847  2.031  0.086   
cutpoint 3 1.435  2.693  1.385   
cutpoint 4 2.348   3.707   2.896   
         
Observations 592  592  589   
Pseudo-R2 0.0241  0.1128  0.3996   
Log-likelihood -672.275  -611.14  -409.549   
 NOTE:Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  *** p < .01  ** p < .05  * p < .1   
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Table 7- Change in Probability of Repression When Moving from Parliamentary to Presidential Democracy 
Figure 1-     95% CI    
Torture  Mean Standard Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
          
Low Levels -0.15 0.056  -0.257  -0.037   
Moderate Levels 0.064 0.025  0.017  0.116   
Pervasive Levels 0.085 0.035   0.02   0.156   
Figure 2-     95% CI    
Political Killings Mean Standard Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
          
Low Levels -0.381 0.06  -0.5  -0.262   
Moderate Levels 0.31 0.05  0.21  0.407   
Pervasive Levels 0.071 0.022   0.036   0.12   
Figure 3-     95% CI    
Disappearances Mean Standard Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
          
Low Levels -0.293 0.051  -0.398  -0.199   
Moderate Levels 0.232 0.04  0.157  0.315   
Pervasive Levels 0.062 0.022   0.028   0.111   
Figure 4-     95% CI    
Political Imprisonment Mean Standard Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
          
Low Levels -0.053 0.062  -0.175  0.068   
Moderate Levels 0.031 0.037  -0.043  0.102   
Pervasive Levels 0.022 0.026   -0.027   0.077   
Figure 5-      95% CI    
Amnesty International Mean Standard Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
           
Secure Rule of Law -0.316 0.036  -0.387  -0.245   
Limited Violations 0.011 0.021  -0.031  0.051   
Extensive Violations 0.213 0.03  0.153  0.273   
Near Systematic Violations 0.086 0.019  0.053  0.128   
Systematic Violation 0.006 0.003   0.002   0.013   
Figure 6-      95% CI    
State Department Mean Standard Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
           
Secure Rule of Law -0.246 0.051  -0.345  -0.146   
Limited Violations 0.153 0.032  0.091  0.216   
Extensive Violations 0.085 0.022  0.046  0.132   
Near Systematic Violations 0.007 0.003  0.002  0.016   
Systematic Violation 0.00006 0.00008   0.0000005   0.0003   
 
